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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN AVIATION CASE LAW
MICHAEL J. SEHR*
I. INTRODUCTION
R EPORTING ON recent developments in aviation case
law requires the imposition of a number of definitional
restraints in order to limit the task to manageable propor-
tions. First, the concept of "aviation case law" for the
purpose of this article has been narrowed to those areas
of the law which most directly affect the concerns of attor-
neys practicing in the area of aviation tort law. Within
such areas, however, certain select nonaviation cases have
been reported because they may be significant to aviation
practitioners. The clearest example of such an area is the
case law arising under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act.
Second, the standards for identifying a development in
the law, as distinguished from simply another reported
case, have been flexible. In certain areas, trial court opin-
ions have been included because of the paucity of appel-
late authority, while in other areas decisions of the lower
courts have been excluded because they demonstrate no
development of legal principle. Finally, "recent," for pur-
poses of this article, can be defined as including the pe-
riod from November 1, 1985 through February 15, 1987,
although later cases have been included on a selective
basis.
* Managing Partner, Haskell & Perrin, Chicago, Illinois. B.S. 1972, Loyola
University of Chicago; J.D. 1977, University of Chicago Law School. Mr. Sehr
gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Andrew Kochanowski, an associate at
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In the past year there have been significant develop-
ments in a number of areas. Of particular importance are
the reported cases involving the National Transportation
Safety Board and the government contractor defense. In
addition, specific crashes have generated important deci-
sions. For example, the litigation arising out of the KAL
aircraft shot down by the Soviet air force has produced a
number of Warsaw Convention opinions, and the crash of
a Pan American jet at New Orleans has generated several
opinions on wrongful death damages.
II. JURISDICTION
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Other Issues Raised Under
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
A number of issues have been raised concerning the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA)' in the last
year. These issues have been explored in both aviation
and nonaviation cases. A brief review of those cases is
worthwhile here because of the potential importance of
these issues to foreign air carriers.
1. Subject Matter Jurisdiction and the Retrospective
Application of the FSIA
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit held that FSIA did not confer subject matter juris-
diction on a foreign sovereign in a matter involving trans-
actions, activities, and events occurring prior to 1952. In
Jackson v. People's Republic of China,2 the court of appeals
was asked to decide whether there was subject matter ju-
risdiction over the People's Republic of China in a matter
involving bearer bonds issued in 1911. The court, relying
on the lower court's analysis of the FSIA, the legislative
history of the Act, and the plain language of the statute,
1 28 U.S.C.A. § 1602 (West Supp. 1987). The FSIA was enacted in 1976 to
grant authority to the federal courts over decisions of sovereign immunity and to
codify the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity.
794 F.2d 1490 (11th Cir. 1986).
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held that there is no retrospective application of the FSIA
to alter any rights with respect to pre-1952 causes of ac-
tion. The court noted that its decision was inconsistent
with the Second Circuit opinion in Corporacion Venezolana
de Fomento v. Vintero Sales Corp.3
In Gayda v. USSR,4 the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of New York denied defendants' mo-
tion to dismiss on grounds of lack of jurisdiction under
the FSIA. The action arose out of the air crash disaster in
Warsaw, Poland on March 14, 1980. Defendants, manu-
facturers of a Soviet made aircraft, moved for dismissal
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the action and
in personam jurisdiction over them.
Defendants argued that they were entitled to immunity
under the FSIA, and that plaintiffs could prove no set of
facts within the commercial activities exception contained
in FSIA which would entitle them to relief. The court
stated that the burden of proof in establishing the inappli-
cability of an exception to immunity rests upon the party
claiming immunity. Plaintiffs alleged that the various de-
fendants designed, manufactured, assembled, tested, in-
spected, marketed, sold, leased, and serviced the aircraft,
and the court held that these allegations qualify as com-
mercial activities within the meaning of the FSIA. De-
fendants' affidavits in support of their motion failed to
show that they did not have a connection to any of these
activities. Accordingly, the court held that subject matter
jurisdiction was proper.
The court similarly disposed of defendants' argument
that it lacked in personam jurisdiction over them. It held
that in personam jurisdiction exists as long as the defend-
ants in such an action are properly served under the
FSIA's service provision.
In Barkanic v. People's Republic of China,5 the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of New York
s 629 F.2d 786 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080 (1981).
4 3 Av. L. Rep. (CCH) (20 Av. Cas.) 17,634 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 1987).
. 3 Av. L. Rep. (CCH) (20 Av. Cas.) 17,402 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 1986).
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dealt with subject matter jurisdiction under the FSIA in a
wrongful death action arising out of an air crash that took
place in China. The court held that the defendant, which
was a foreign sovereign, should be dismissed for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction under the FSIA. In so holding,
it stated that a federal court cannot assert jurisdiction
over a "foreign state" under the FSIA without a suffi-
ciently significant nexus between the complaining party's
claims and the foreign state's commercial activities in the
United States. In this case the only connection between
the plaintiff's claims and the foreign agency's commercial
activities in the United States was that a private travel
agent in the United States issued two unconfirmed tickets
to plaintiff's decedent for a flight to be conducted exclu-
sively in the People's Republic of China. The court found
these facts to be insufficient to establish a nexus between
the activities and the United States.
In In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of September 1, 1983,6 the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia
held that the United States had no subject matter jurisdic-
tion in a case where the plaintiff's decedent, a passenger
killed aboard the Korean Airlines flight shot down by the
Soviets, purchased his ticket from a travel agent in Mon-
treal, Canada.7 In arriving at this conclusion, the court
rejected the argument that the decedent was to leave from
New York, make intermediate stops in foreign nations,
and then return to New York, and refused to look beyond
the face of the ticket in determining the passenger's
destination.
2. The "Act of State" Doctrine
A pair of cases in the Fifth and Sixth Circuits dealing
with the 1983 nationalization of Mexican banks distin-
Av. Lit. Rep. (Andrews) 6235 (D.D.C. Nov. 26, 1986).
Id. The court applied California law, because the case originated in the U.S.
District Court for the Central District of California before subsequent transfer to
the District of Columbia. Id.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
guished the application of the "act of state" doctrine8
from the FSIA. In Grass v. Credito Mexicano, S.A. ,9 the Fifth
Circuit, in a securities action brought by a United States
citizen against a Mexican national bank, held that the
FSIA did not bar the action because of the "commercial
activities exception"' 0 contained in that statute. The
court did find, however, that, under the act of state doc-
trine, the Mexican government's currency control deci-
sions were clearly beyond the inquiry of United States
courts. The court clearly distinguished and limited its ap-
plication of the act of state doctrine to acts committed by
a foreign government in its own territory. It held that the
act of state doctrine did not bar that part of plaintiff's
claim which was based on the Mexican bank's failure to
comply with the law at a time prior to the nationaliza-
tion."' The Sixth Circuit reached a similar result in Riedel
v. Bancam, S.A.,12 where the court held that the lower
courts had subject matter jurisdiction over a securities vi-
olation and contract action against a nationalized Mexican
bank.
3. Exclusivity of the FSIA as a Source of Jurisdiction
A district court has addressed the issue of whether the
FSIA is the exclusive source of jurisdiction over a foreign
sovereign. In Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentina,' 3 the
district court held that the FSIA exceptions are the exclu-
sive source of jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign, even
in instances where another federal statute may confer ju-
risdiction. The court in Amerada Hess held that the Alien
Tort Act 14 does not provide a basis for jurisdiction. The
8 The act of state doctrine generally prohibits American courts from ruling on
issues resulting from acts of the government of another sovereign done within its
own territory. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
9 797 F.2d 220 (5th Cir. 1986).
,o 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605(a)(2) (West Supp. 1987).
1 Grass, 797 F.2d at 222.
" 792 F.2d 587 (6th Cir. 1986).
15 638 F. Supp. 73 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
14 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1976).
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FSIA "narrows the class of defendants," 15 but does not
repeal any conflicting provisions of the Alien Tort Act.
However, the Alien Tort Act does not create an implied
exception to the FSIA. In so ruling, the court expressly
disapproved a previous holding to the contrary in Von
Dardel v. USSR. 6
In Schroeder v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 17 the district
court held that the FSIA's jurisdictional provision 18 pre-
cludes a trial by jury. The court reasoned that this section
of the FSIA did not deny plaintiff's Seventh Amendment 19
right to jury trial, because the Seventh Amendment pre-
serves a right to jury trial only if such right existed at com-
mon law, and there was no right to a jury trial against a
foreign sovereign in 1791. The plaintiff argued that the
federal diversity statute2 0 conferred an alternative source
of jurisdiction over Lufthansa, permitting a jury trial be-
cause Lufthansa is also a citizen or subject of a foreign
state. The court, however, rejected this argument and
held that such jurisdiction was not proper in this case be-
cause an entity such as Lufthansa cannot be both a foreign
state under the FSIA and a citizen or subject of a foreign
state under the federal diversity statute.
15 Amerada Hess, 638 F. Supp. at 76.
- See id at 77, expressly disapproving Von Dardel v. USSR, 623 F. Supp. 246
(D.D.C. 1985).
,7 19 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,347 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
18 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1982). This section provides as follows:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction without regard to
amount in controversy of any non-jury civil action against a foreign
state as defined in section 1603(a) of this title as to any claim for
relief in personam with respect to which the foreign state is not enti-
tled to immunity either under sections 1605-1607 of this title or
under any applicable international agreement.
Id.
The Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution provides as
follows:
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no
fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of
the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. VII.
2o 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1976).
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4. Waiver of Sovereign Immunity
In Hercaire International v. Argentina, 21 a district court
held that when a foreign state willingly consents to suit in
a United States court, and files a counterclaim against the
plaintiff, it cannot later invoke sovereign immunity with
respect to execution of any judgment against it. The
plaintiff in that case obtained a judgment against Argen-
tina for breach of contract resulting from a commercial
transaction between the parties. When Argentina did not
pay on the judgment, the court granted an order permit-
ting execution of the judgment. Plaintiff then levied the
judgment against an Aerolineas Argentinas Boeing 727
commercial airliner. Aerolineas Argentinas, the Argen-
tine airline, is wholly owned by the Republic of Argentina.
Argentina claimed that it had not waived its sovereign im-
munity in the case, and that the plaintiff had therefore im-
properly levied upon its property. The court held that
Argentina, in answering the complaint in the original
case, implicitly waived its sovereign immunity22 and the
21 642 F. Supp. 126 (S.D. Fla. 1986).
22The FSIA provisions for waiver of immunity provide as follows:
(a) The property in the United States of a foreign state, as defined in
section 1603(a) of this chapter, used for a commercial activity in the
United States, shall not be immune from attachment in aid of execu-
tion, or from execution, upon a judgment entered by a court of the
United States or of a State after the effective date of this Act, if- (1)
the foreign state has waived its immunity from attachment in aid of
execution or from execution either explicitly or by implication,
notwithstanding any withdrawal of the waiver the foreign state may
purport to effect except in accordance with the terms of the waiver,
or...
(b) In addition to subsection (a), any property in the United States
of an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state engaged in com-
mercial activity in the United States shall not be immune from at-
tachment in aid of execution, or from execution, upon a judgment
entered by a court of the United States or of a State after the effec-
tive date of this Act if- (1) the agency or instrumentality has waived
its immunity from attachment in aid of execution or from execution
either explicitly or implicitly, notwithstanding any withdrawal of the
waiver the agency or instrumentality may purport to effect except in
accordance with the terms of the waiver ..... (d) The property of a
foreign state, as defined in section 1603(l)(a) of this chapter, used
for a commercial activity in the United States, shall not be immune
from attachment prior to the entry of judgment in any action
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immunity of its agencies. The court said that, in order to
waive its sovereign immunity to jurisdiction while retain-
ing immunity as to execution, the foreign state and its
agencies must expressly retain that immunity, either in the
answer to the complaint or in some other form.23
Aerolineas Argentinas also argued that it is a separate
and distinct entity apart from the Republic of Argentina.
The court held that where a sovereign owns all of the as-
sets of an agency any presumption that the agency is an
entity separate from the sovereign is overcome.24
In Aboujdid v. Singapore Airlines,25 the Court of Appeals of
the State of New York considered whether an air carrier
could waive the defense of sovereign immunity. This case
arose out of the hijacking of an Air France aircraft to En-
tebbe, Uganda in 1976, and involved Gulf Aviation (Gulf)
and Singapore Airlines (Singapore) as defendants. The
claims against Air France had previously been dismissed
on forum non conveniens 2 6 and Warsaw Convention 27
grounds in People ex rel. Compagnie Nationale Air France v.
Giliberto.28 Aboujdid was filed in New York state and was
pending at the time the Giliberto case was dismissed. Gulf
filed an answer raising four affirmative defenses, but not
raising the issue of sovereign immunity. Singapore filed a
motion to dismiss on grounds of forum non conveniens. Af-
ter extensive argument and appeal, the court denied this
motion. Thereafter, Singapore filed an answer, raising
sovereign immunity as a defense. Gulf later removed the
action to a federal district court and, at some point, re-
brought in a court of the United States or of a State, or prior to the
elapse of the period of time provided in subsection (c) of this sec-
tion, if - (1) the foreign state has explicitly waived its immunity from
attachment prior to judgment, notwithstanding any withdrawal of
the waiver the foreign state may purport to effect except in accord-
ance with the terms of the waiver ....
28 U.S.C. §§ 1610(a), (b)(l), (d)(l) (1982).
2-. Hercaire Int'l, 642 F. Supp. at 129.
24 Id. at 130.
2 67 N.Y.2d 450, 494 N.E.2d 1055, 503 N.Y.S.2d 555 (1986).
' See infra notes 60-83 for a discussion of forum non conveniens cases.
' See infra notes 129-138 for a discussion of Warsaw Convention cases.
2s 74 Ill. 2d 90, 383 N.E.2d 977 (1978).
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quested leave to amend its answer to raise the defense of
sovereign immunity. The federal court remanded the
case to state court and Gulf was allowed to amend its an-
swer. The trial court held that Gulf had waived its sover-
eign immunity defense, but allowed Gulf to assert that
defense because it found that there was no prejudice to
the plaintiffs since Singapore had properly raised the de-
fense. The trial court found that there was no immunity,
however, because the actions complained of came within
the "commercial activity" exception to the FSIA.29 On
appeal, the appellate division disagreed with the trial
court's finding on this issue, holding that the "commercial
activity" exception did not apply in this case and that Sin-
gapore should therefore be dismissed. It also held that
Gulf had waived its sovereign immunity defense by failing
to assert the defense in its original answer.3
The court of appeals concluded that failure to raise the
sovereign immunity defense in the first responsive plead-
ing was not, per se, an implied waiver of the defense.3
Instead, the test was whether the defendant had "con-
sciously decided to take part in the litigation. ' 32 The fac-
tors the court cited as significant were: 1) Gulf filing a
counterclaim against the plaintiffs and their attorneys; 2)
the raising of affirmative defenses which did not include
sovereign immunity; and 3) the failure to assert sovereign
immunity as a defense for almost five years. The court of
appeals further affirmed the appellate division's conclu-
sion that the "commercial activity" exception of the FSIA
did not apply.3 Therefore, it affirmed the dismissal of
Singapore and found that there was no sovereign immu-
nity defense as to Gulf.3 4
211 Aboujdid, 494 N.E.2d at 1057.
Io /d.
, Id. at 1058-59.
.12 Id. at 1059.
.- Id. at 1060.
.1 Id. at 1059.
1987]
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B. Personal Jurisdiction
1. Personal Jurisdiction Under the FSIA
In Meadows v. Dominican Republic,3 5 the district court ap-
plied section 1605(a)(2)(iii) of the FSIA to find that the
Dominican Republic and one of its executive agencies
were not immune from suit. The court said the jurisdic-
tional analysis under this action was two-fold. The court
must first determine (1) whether the case falls into a statu-
tory sovereign immunity exception, and (2) whether exer-
cise of personal jurisdiction is constitutionally
permissible. With respect to personal jurisdiction, the
court held that contacts relevant to jurisdiction encom-
passed the entire United States, not just the forum state.
The court did not agree with the argument that only con-
tacts relating to the transaction at issue were relevant in
determining whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction
is constitutionally permissible. 6
Under this analysis, therefore, minimum contacts any-
where in the United States by a foreign sovereign are suf-
ficient to confer in personam jurisdiction. The court in
Crimson Semiconductor, Inc. v. Electronum 37 reached a similar
result. In that case the court applied the International Shoe
Co. v. Washington 3 8 test, stating that the factors to be con-
sidered in determining whether personal jurisdiction is
proper in a given case are "[1] the extent to which defend-
ants availed themselves of the privileges of American law,
[2] the extent to which litigation in the United States
would be foreseeable to them, [3] inconvenience to de-
fendants of litigating in the United States, and [4] the
countervailing interests of the United States in hearing
the suit." 39
The United States District Court for the Eastern District
628 F. Supp. 599 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
I ,d. at 605-06.
.17 629 F. Supp. 903 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
- 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
39 Crimson Semiconductor, 629 F. Supp. at 907 (quoting Texas Trading v. Federal
Republic, 647 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1981)).
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of Pennsylvania reached a contrary result in Unidyne Corp.
v. Aerolineas Argentinas.4 ° In Unidyne, a domestic corpora-
tion was not allowed to recover from a foreign airline for
damages suffered in transit, because the district court
would not exercise personal jurisdiction over the air car-
rier under a "national contacts" theory. The court did
not agree with the plaintiff that satisfying sections 1605 '
(subject matter jurisdiction), 1391 (f)42 (venue), and
160843 (service of process) automatically confers personal
jurisdiction under the FSIA. A constitutionally required
minimum contacts test must also be met, and the court
ruled that the adoption of a "national contacts" approach
did not satisfy such test. 4
2. Personal Jurisdiction Over Private Parties
In Farnham v. Bristow Helicopters,45 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit considered whether
Louisiana's long-arm statute46 required a connection be-
tween the activities which constituted "doing business" in
the state and the actions giving rise to a claim for wrong-
ful death. The defendants in Farnham included Bristow
Helicopters, Ltd. (Bristow, Ltd.), which was organized
under the laws of the United Kingdom. That corporation
had two subsidiaries, one of which was an Indonesian cor-
poration named P.T. Masayu Helicopters (Masayu). The
wrongful death action arose out of the operations of
Masayu in Indonesia. The district court dismissed the
plaintiffs' claims, holding that there was no personal juris-
diction over the defendants because Louisiana's long-arm
statute required a nexus between the actions constituting
"doing business" in the state and the cause of action.
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision.
40 19 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,115 (E.D. Va. 1985).
41 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (1976).
42 28 U.S.C. § 1391(f) (1976).
4s 28 U.S.C. § 1608 (1976).
44 Unidyne, 19 Av. Cas. (CCH) at 18,199.
4, 776 F.2d 535 (5th Cir. 1985).
46 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:3201 (West 1968).
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The court initially reviewed the requirements of the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment47 and found
that the amendment did not require a nexus between a
defendant's actions in the state and the activities giving
rise to the claim.48 Within the "perimeter" established by
the due process clause, however, the court pointed out
that states can, and have, adopted more restrictive long-
arm statute provisions.
The Fifth Circuit had previously interpreted the Louisi-
ana long-arm statute as not requiring a connection be-
tween business transacted in Louisiana and an asserted
claim in Pedelahore v. Astropark.49 However, in Farnham the
court reviewed two Louisiana appellate court cases issued
subsequent to the opinion in Pedelahore. In those cases,
the courts rejected the Pedelahore decision and required a
connection between the transaction of business in Louisi-
ana and the asserted claim. The Fifth Circuit therefore
agreed with the district court's conclusion that such a con-
nection was required. Since Bristow, Ltd.'s actions in
Louisiana were not connected to the helicopter accident
in Indonesia, the court held that Bristow, Ltd. was not
subject to jurisdiction in Louisiana. The court further
held that Masayu could not be subject to jurisdiction as a
subsidiary of Bristow, Ltd. It found that the action of
Bristow, Ltd. in recruiting the helicopter pilot who was
eventually involved in the fatal accident at Louisiana State
University had no significant relationship to the claim,
and therefore did not create a basis for jurisdiction.50
In Scott v. Breeland,5 ' the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit directly addressed the question of
the permissible scope of a state long-arm statute under
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The case was filed in the United States District Court for
41 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
48 Farnham, 776 F.2d at 537 (citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia v.
Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984)).
41' 745 F.2d 346 (5th Cir. 1984).
so Farnham, 776 F.2d at 538.
" 792 F.2d 925 (9th Cir. 1986).
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the Central District of California, hence California's long-
arm statute52 governed personal jurisdiction. That statute
provides that "[a] court of this state may exercise jurisdic-
tion on any basis not inconsistent with the constitution of
this state or of the United States."'5 3 The Ninth Circuit
concluded that "federal courts in California may exercise
jurisdiction to the fullest extent permitted by due
process.' ' "
In determining the extent to which due process allows
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident, the court relied
on Helicopteros Nacionales,55 in which the Supreme Court
explained the distinction between general jurisdiction and
specific jurisdiction. General jurisdiction requires that a
nonresident defendant's activities within the state be sub-
stantial or continuous and systematic, and creates jurisdic-
tion even for claims unconnected to the defendant's in-
state activities. Specific jurisdiction is restricted to causes
of action arising out of the defendant's forum activities.
Having made this distinction, the court found that specific
jurisdiction must meet a three part test in order to satisfy
the requirements of due process. First, the nonresident
defendant must purposefully avail himself of the privilege
of conducting activities in the forum through an act or
transaction. Second, the claim must arise out of one of
the defendant's forum activities. Third, the exercise ofju-
risdiction must be reasonable under the circumstances.
5 6
In Scott, the claim arose out of an alleged assault on the
plaintiff by the defendant which occurred on an aircraft in
Reno, Nevada before it left for a flight to California. The
defendant was taken off the aircraft before it proceeded to
California. The court found that the contacts between the
defendant and the State of California were insufficient to
support general jurisdiction over the defendant. Since
52 CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 1973).
53 Id.
Scott, 792 F.2d at 927 (citing Data Disc, Inc. v. Systems Technology Assoc.,
557 F.2d 1280, 1285 (9th Cir. 1977)).
446 U.S. at 408.
Scott, 792 F.2d at 927.
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the alleged assault took place while the aircraft was on the
ground in Reno, Nevada, the court found that the defend-
ant "neither performed an act or consummated a transac-
tion whereby he can be said to have 'purposefully
avail[ed] himself of the privilege of conducting activities
in [California], thereby invoking the benefits and protec-
tions of its laws.' "" Therefore, the court affirmed the
dismissal of the plaintiff's action for lack of in personam
jurisdiction.
In Thompson v. Bellanca Aircraft Corp. ," the Massachusetts
Superior Court held that Massachusetts' long-arm statute
did not grant personal jurisdiction over a corporation that
had purchased the assets of a bankrupt aircraft manufac-
turer, even though the defendant was presently engaged
in the business of selling spare parts for the aircraft under
the bankrupt manufacturer's name. This wrongful death
action resulted from the crash of an aircraft which had
been designed by Bellanca Aircraft Corporation in 1970.
In 1980 Bellanca Aircraft Corporation filed for bank-
ruptcy, and in 1982, pursuant to an asset purchase agree-
ment, Viking Aviation, Inc. obtained the right to use the
name of "Bellanca." Viking Aviation did not, however,
assume the liabilities of Bellanca. After the purchase, the
defendant manufactured replacement parts for the model
aircraft involved in the crash at issue, but did not sell any
spare parts for use on the accident aircraft. In addition,
the defendant leased a portion of the physical facilities
once owned by Bellanca.
Plaintiffs argued that the defendant corporation was a
"mere continuation or reincarnation" of Bellanca. There-
fore, plaintiff argued that it should fall under the excep-
tion to the general rule that successor corporations are
not liable for the negligence of their predecessor. The
court stated that defendant was not a "mere continua-
tion," and held there was no authority for imputing a
predecessor corporation's business contacts to a succes-
.7 Id. at 928.
." 3 Av. L. Rep. (CCH) (20 Av. Cas.) 17,619 (Mass. Super. Ct. Dec. 30, 1986).
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sor corporation for the purpose of establishing personal
jurisdiction under the product line theory, or any other
theory. Therefore, the court held that the defendant did
not have minimum contacts with the forum state under
the facts alleged.5 9
C. Forum Non Conveniens
In In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, Louisiana on
July 9, 1982,60 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit reviewed the application of theforum non con-
veniens doctrine where an aviation accident occurred in the
United States. Several of the passengers killed in the
crash were citizens and residents of Uruguay. The plain-
tiffs were relatives of the decedents, and one plaintiff
sought, inter alia, recovery for the death of his aunt.
The defendant air carrier moved to dismiss on the
grounds of forum non conveniens, having indicated its will-
ingness to "(1) submit to the jurisdiction of the courts of
Uruguay, (2) concede liability, (3) waive any statute of lim-
itations defense, (4) waive the Warsaw Convention limita-
tion of damages, and (5) guarantee satisfaction of any
judgment entered against it in Uruguay." 6' The trial
court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss and the
defendant appealed.62
On appeal the Fifth Circuit, citing Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gil-
bert63 and Piper Aircraft Corp. v. Reyno 64 held that the first
determination that must be made with respect to a forum
non conveniens motion is whether American or foreign law
applies to the action. The court stated, "[i]f American
law, either federal or state, applies to the action, the fed-
eral court should retain jurisdiction; if foreign law applies,
dismissal may be appropriate if there exists a more conve-
"' Id. at 17,623.
.... 789 F.2d 1092 (5th Cir. 1986).
ol Id. at 1094.
62 Id. at 1098.
w, 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
454 U.S. 235 (1981).
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nient forum."' 6 5 The court then turned to the question of
which law would apply to the action. It determined that
Uruguayan law would apply with respect to whether re-
covery should be allowed for the interests of a nephew,
but Louisiana law would apply with respect to the mea-
sure of damages. The court then reviewed the private-in-
terest and public-interest factors set forth in Gulf Oil, and
determined that Louisiana was a more appropriate forum
for this proceeding than Uruguay.66
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Cir-
cuit, in a nonaviation products liability case, recently up-
held a forum non conveniens dismissal in De Melo v. Lederle
Laboratories.6 7 The plaintiff in that case was a Brazilian
school teacher who was treated with the drug Myambutol,
and developed a side effect of optic atrophy, which led to
permanent blindness. The drug was manufactured and
distributed in Brazil by a Brazilian corporation that was a
wholly owned subsidiary of Lederle, an American corpo-
ration. The drug had been developed in the United
States, and certain warnings concerning the drug were
translated from the English language into Portugese. The
English language version warned of permanent vision
loss, while the Portugese version warned only of a tempo-
rary vision loss.
The Eighth Circuit reviewed the public and private in-
terest factors set forth in Gulf Oil.68 It found that the un-
availability of punitive damages and damages for pain and
suffering did not render Brazil an inadequate forum. De-
spite conflicting evidence, the court found that contingent
fee contracts and free legal assistance were available in
Brazil. The court's opinion cited several cases finding that
Brazil provides an adequate alternative forum for the pur-
pose of forum non conveniens analysis.
Having found that the public interest factors favored
65 In re Air Crash Near New Orleans, 789 F.2d at 1096.
.I Id. at 1097.
117 801 F.2d 1058 (8th Cir. 1986).
" 330 U.S. at 508-09.
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dismissal, the court then turned to the private interest fac-
tors set forth in Gulf Oil.6 9 With respect to the availability
and access to evidence, the court pointed out that the dis-
trict court required Lederle to provide access to evidence
existing in the United States if the case went forward in
Brazil. However, if the case went forward in the United
States, Lederle would be deprived of access to evidence
relating to the plaintiff's treatment, doctors, and the
warnings about the drug given in Brazil. The court also
pointed out that Lederle would not be able to implead po-
tential third party defendants in a United States action.
Finally, the court found that imposing the costs of litiga-
tion on the citizens of Minnesota, where the suit was filed,
would be inappropriate, since there were virtually no con-
tacts between the incident and Minnesota. In a footnote
the court pointed out, "Minnesota apparently was chosen
as a forum because [plaintiff's] attorney, the father of a
Peace Corps worker [plaintiff] met in Brazil, lives in Min-
nesota. ' ' 70 Therefore, the court found the district court's
dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds to be reasonable
and affirmed.
The leak of methyl isocyanate from a Union Carbide
plant at Bhopal, India in December of 1984 led to a storm
of litigation and controversy when a number of plaintiffs
filed personal injury actions against Union Carbide in the
United States. The Judicial Panel for Multidistrict Litiga-
tion assigned the federal court cases arising out of this
disaster to Judge Keenan of the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York.
In an exhaustive opinion, Judge Keenan dismissed the
cases on the grounds of forum non conveniens in May 1986.
The In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal,
India in December 1984 7' decision contains an extensive re-
view of the adequacy of the Indian judicial system as an
alternative forum. The court concluded that a foreign ju-
,is, Id. at 508.
7,, De Melo, 801 F.2d at 1064 n.6.
7, 634 F. Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
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dicial system was adequate unless it provided no remedy
at all to a plaintiff. Based on its review of the Indian judi-
cial system, the court concluded, "Far from exhibiting a
tendency to be so 'inadequate or unsatisfactory' as to pro-
vide 'no remedy at all,' the courts of India appeared to be
well up to the task of handling this case. 72
The court then went on to examine the private and
public interest concerns mandated by Gulf Oil.73 A unique
aspect of the Bhopal case was that the government of In-
dia had enacted legislation providing that it had the exclu-
sive right to represent Indian plaintiffs. The government
of India then asserted a claim in the Bhopal litigation
against Union Carbide, and further asserted that it chose
to litigate in the United States. The court nevertheless
found that the Indian government had paramount interest
in the case being litigated in India. After balancing all of
the factors required by the doctrine offorum non conveniens,
the court dismissed the action, conditioned upon Union
Carbide's agreement that it would submit to jurisdiction
in India, waive any statute of limitations defenses, agree
to satisfy any judgment rendered against it, and submit to
discovery under the model of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.4
In Kryvicky v. Scandinavian Airlines System," the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the
dismissal of plaintiff's wrongful death action against an
airplane manufacturer and an airline arising out of a crash
in Spain. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's
conclusion that Spain provided an adequate alternative
forum underforum non conveniens grounds. One of the de-
fendants, Boeing, submitted an affidavit of a Spanish at-
torney attesting that Spain recognized the cause of action
for wrongful death, Spanish courts would exercise juris-
diction when the defendants admitted to jurisdiction, and
72 Id. at 852.
7 330 U.S. at 508-09.
74 In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster, 634 F. Supp. at 867.
7 3 Av. L. Rep. (CCH) (20 Av. Cas.) 17,563, (6th Cir. Dec. 29, 1986).
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Spanish courts would permit defendants to waive any stat-
ute of limitations defense. Following GulfOi176 and Piper,77
the Sixth Circuit found that Spain offered an adequate al-
ternative forum.
The Superior Court of Connecticut refused to dismiss a
lawsuit involving a foreign aircrash in Miller v. United Tech-
nologies Corp. In that case the plaintiffs were survivors of
members of the Egyptian Air Force who died in the crash
of an F-16 aircraft. The aircraft was manufactured by
General Dynamics, the engines were designed and manu-
factured by United Technologies, and the fuel pump was
designed and manufactured by Chandler Evans, Inc., all
in the United States.
Following the Bhopal opinion closely, the court in Miller
found that the Egyptian legal system provided an ade-
quate alternative forum. The court then turned to the pri-
vate interest factors set forth in Gulf Oil.79 The court
found that the relevant evidence and documents in the
case were scattered throughout the United States and
Egypt. It further found, however, that the documents re-
lating to the design and manufacture of the aircraft and its
components contained the "crucial evidence" in the case,
and that the cost of translating these documents into
Arabic or French for use in Egyptian litigation would out-
weigh the cost of translating relevant Egyptian documents
into English. 0
With respect to the availability of witnesses, the court
pointed out that the defendants had participated in the
accident investigation, and therefore not only their manu-
facturing personnel, but also their investigative personnel
were in the United States. The plaintiff contended that
the eyewitnesses to the accident were members of the
American military who were now United States residents.
7M 330 U.S. at 501.
77 454 U.S. at 235.
7s 40 Conn. Supp. 451, 515 A.2d 386 (1986).
71, 330 U.S. at 508.
) Miller, 515 A.2d at 394-95.
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Finally, the court observed that almost all of the expert
witnesses would be Americans since Egypt has no domes-
tic aircraft industry. Discounting any interests in a view of
the accident scene, the court concluded that the private
interest factors weighed in favor of retaining jurisdiction
in Connecticut."1
In reviewing the public interest factors set out in Gulf
Oil82 the court concluded that Egyptian law would apply
whether the case remained in Connecticut or was trans-
ferred to Egypt. The court further decided that Egypt's
interest in the litigation was superior to that of Connecti-
cut. Despite the fact that the court had concluded that
Egypt provided an adequate remedy, and the public inter-
est factors pointed to the litigation being transferred to
Egypt, the court held that Connecticut should retain the
case because of the significance of the private interest fac-
tors indicating the case should remain in Connecticut, and
in deference to the plaintiffs' choice of forum.
Finally, in Smedesman v. United Air Lines,83 a New York
state court dismissed an action on forum non convenzens
grounds on the condition that defendant accept service in
New Jersey or Illinois, and waive any present or future
statute of limitations defenses. In Smedesman, there was an
alleged accident aboard a United Airlines aircraft originat-
ing in New Jersey and landing in Illinois. Plaintiff resided
in New Jersey and received medical attention in New
Jersey and Illinois. Under the circumstances, the court
stated that there is no indication that any transaction took
place in New York, and granted defendant's motion to
dismiss.
III. FEDERAL PREEMPTION
In Wardair Canada v. Florida Department of Revenue,84 the
United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of
81 Id. at 395.
" 330 U.S. at 508-09.
- 3 Av. L. Rep. (CCH) (20 Av. Cas.) 17,618, (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. Dec. 12, 1986).
84 106 S. Ct. 2369 (1986).
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whether individual states have the power to levy sales
taxes on aviation fuel used by foreign airlines. In 1983
the State of Florida enacted a fuel tax at a rate of five per-
cent on all aviation fuel including that sold to foreign air-
lines. Wardair obtained an injunction in Florida state
court against the collection of the tax. The state appealed
the case to the Supreme Court of Florida, which reversed
the trial court and held that the tax did not violate the
Commerce Clause or the "U.S./Canadian Agreement,"
and that the federal government had not preempted the
right of the states to levy sales taxes on aviation fuel.
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the decision
of the Supreme Court of Florida. In an opinion written by
Justice Brennan, the Court first noted that the federal
government had not completely preempted state regula-
tion of international aviation by enacting the Federal Avi-
ation Act.8 5 The Court held that there was no express
preemption of state law, and where there is no actual con-
flict between federal and state law, it is required "that
there be evidence of a congressional intent to pre-empt
the specific field covered by the state law."'8 6 The Court
found, to the contrary, that the Federal Aviation Act spe-
cifically allowed sales taxes on the sale of goods or serv-
ices, and did not preempt state action in this area.
The Court then turned to the question of whether the
Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution pro-
hibited Florida from enacting a fuel tax on foreign air car-
riers.8 7 The Court noted that Wardair had acknowledged
that the tax did not violate the Commerce Clause as it ap-
plied to domestic air carriers, since it met the tests previ-
ously set out by the United States Supreme Court to judge
whether a state tax violates the interstate application of
the Commerce Clause. However, the Commerce Clause
also provides that Congress shall have power "to regulate
1,5 See 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301, 1552 (1982).
so Wardair Canada, 106 S. Ct. at 2372.
87 Id.
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commerce with foreign nations. 8 8 In Japan Line, Ltd. v.
County of Los Angeles,89 the Court had required that a state
tax affecting foreign commerce be judged under two addi-
tional criteria: first, whether the tax "creates a substantial
risk of international multiple taxation" 90 and second,
"whether the tax prevents the federal government from
speaking with one voice when regulating commercial rela-
tions with foreign governments." 9' Wardair acknowl-
edged that the tax did not create a danger of multiple
taxation. Therefore, the sole question before the Court
was whether the Florida tax would threaten the ability of
the federal government "to speak with one voice." 92 The
Solicitor General of the United States joined with Wardair
in urging the court to conclude that the tax had such an
effect.
The Court rejected the argument of Wardair and the
Solicitor General. It found that the Chicago Convention
on International Civil Aviation (The Chicago Conven-
tion)93 did not forbid sales taxes on fuel, but did preclude
tax on fuel which is "on board an aircraft ... on arrival...
and retained on board on leaving. ' 94
Wardair and the Solicitor General also relied on a reso-
lution of the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO) which would preclude sales taxes by states on avi-
ation fuel purchased by foreign air carriers. The Court
found that the United States was simply a member of
ICAO and that the resolution could not be construed as
reflecting the national policy of the federal government.
The Court was much more swayed by the fact that the
United States had entered into more than seventy bilat-
Ha Article I of the U.S. Constitution provides that Congress shall have the power
to "regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States."
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
8f) 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
9o Id. at 451.
,I Id.
112 Wardair Canada, 106 S. Ct. at 2373.
13 Convention on International Civil Aviation, opened for signature Dec. 7, 1944,
61 Stat. 1180, T.I.A.S. No. 1591, 15 U.N.T.S. 295.
1,4 Wardair Canada, 106 S. Ct. at 2374.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
eral aviation agreements with foreign states which prohib-
ited national taxation of aviation fuel, but, by negative
implication, allowed such taxation by political subdivi-
sions of those nations. The Solicitor General conceded,
"none of our bilateral aviation agreements explicitly inter-
dicts state or local taxes on aviation fuel used by foreign
airlines in international traffic."95 The Court concluded,
"It would turn dormant Commerce Clause analysis en-
tirely upside down to apply it where the Federal Govern-
ment has acted, and to apply it in such a way as to reverse
the policy that the Federal Government has elected to fol-
low."96 The Court took pains to point out, however, that
it was taking no position with respect to whether the Com-
merce Clause would invalidate Florida's sales tax in the
absence of the bilateral agreements.
In Hiawatha Aviation v. Minnesota Department of Health,97
the Supreme Court of Minnesota addressed the issue of
whether the state could regulate entry into the field of air
ambulance service. The plaintiff had been denied permis-
sion under a state regulatory scheme to begin air ambu-
lance service. It appealed the decision of the state agency
denying permission on the ground that federal law had
preempted the states from regulating entry into the air
ambulance field. The Minnesota Supreme Court con-
cluded that the federal registration requirement 98 that an
air carrier must meet in order to operate as an air taxi
providing ambulance operations demonstrated that the
federal government intended to preempt regulation of
entry into that field. However, the court further held that
the state had the power to regulate such operations in "its
traditional role in the delivery of medical services," 99 in-
cluding staffing requirements, the qualifications of per-
-, Id. at 2375.
-" Id.
1,7 389 N.W.2d 507 (Minn. 1986).
- See 14 C.F.R. § 298 (1986).
-" Hiawatha Aviation, 389 N.W.2d at 509.
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sonnel, equipment requirements, and the promulgation
of standards for maintenance of sanitary conditions.
In Christie v. Miller,'00 the Oregon Court of Appeals up-
held a dismissal of an action by landowners who sought an
injunction to prohibit the owners of a private airstrip from
taking off or landing in patterns which would take planes
over the landowners' property. The court held that fed-
eral law preempted the power of state courts to grant the
injunctive relief requested. In addition, the court held
that the trial court properly dismissed the nuisance action
on the ground that the airstrip owners had acquired a pre-
scriptive easement.
IV. TORT LITIGATION - SUBSTANTIVE
A. Liability of Air Carriers: The Warsaw Convention
The Warsaw Convention 101 governs the liability of air
carriers arising out of international air transportation in
most instances. Despite recent setbacks for the plaintiffs'
bar in the valuation of the limitations of liability contained
in the Convention 0 2 and the scope of the injuries coming
within the Convention, 0 3 there have been continued at-
tempts to use the Convention to broaden air carrier
liability.
1. Status of High Contracting Party
In Hyosung (America), Inc. v. Japan Air Lines Co. 104 a dis-
trict court addressed the issue of whether Korea and the
United States are in "treaty relations" with respect to the
Warsaw Convention. The Republic of Korea is a party to
the Hague Protocol, but has never ratified the original
-o 79 Or. App. 412, 719 P.2d 68 (1986).
0, Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Int'l Transp. By
Air, opened for signature Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.I.A.S. No. 876, 137 L.N.T.S.
11 [hereinafter Warsaw Convention]. The Warsaw Convention, a multilateral
treaty now joined by more than 120 nations, is presently codified at 49 U.S.C. app.
§ 1502 (1982).
02 See Trans World Airlines v. Franklin Mint Corp., 104 S. Ct. 1776 (1984).
'' See Air France v. Saks, 105 S. Ct. 1338 (1985).
624 F. Supp. 727 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
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Warsaw Convention. The United States is not a party to
the Hague Protocol. The court took note of the decision
in In Re Korean Air Lines Disaster of September 1, 1983,105 and
reviewed the provisions of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, 0 6 which provides that a state that be-
comes a party to a treaty after an amending agreement
enters into force shall be considered a party to the treaty
as amended. The state shall also be considered a party to
the unamended treaty in relation to any party to the treaty
not bound by the amending agreement. The court found
that since the United States and Korea have both adhered
to the unamended portions of the Warsaw Convention,
the Convention applies to disputes arising from interna-
tional air transportation between the two countries which
are affected by the unamended portions of the Conven-
tion. Because the Warsaw Convention applied to the
plaintiff's claims in the case, the court found that federal
subject matter jurisdiction existed and denied the defend-
ant's motion to dismiss.
2. Federal Jurisdiction
In Darras v. Trans World Airlines 107 the court addressed
the issue of whether a claim made on the basis of the
Montreal Agreement 0 8 provides a sufficient basis for fed-
eral jurisdiction. The plaintiff in Darras asserted that the
court lacked federal jurisdiction, because his claim was
based on the Montreal Agreement, rather than the War-
saw Convention. The court concluded that the Montreal
Agreement merely raised the limits of liability under the
Convention and that it was the Convention that created
,o- Id. at 728. The text of the Hague Convention is appended to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1781 (1976).
,o, Hyosung, 624 F. Supp. at 728.
107 622 F. Supp. 215 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
,,, The Montreal Agreement was entered into on May 13, 1966 between the
International Air Transport Association and various airline carriers. The Agree-
ment involves Article 22(1) of the Warsaw Convention allowing carriers and pas-
sengers by "special contract" to increase the liability limitations established by the
Warsaw Convention. See 31 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966).
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the plaintiff's cause of action.10 9 In an earlier case, Dorizas
v. KL.M. Royal Dutch Airlines,"10 the court held that an ac-
tion under the Warsaw Convention created federal
jurisdiction.
3. Injuries and Events Within the Scope of the Warsaw
Convention
(a) Mental Anguish
In In re Eastern Airlines, Inc., Engine Failure,"' the court
addressed the question of whether mental anguish, stand-
ing alone, was compensable under the Warsaw Conven-
tion. The case arose out of an Eastern Airlines flight from
Miami to Nassau in which the aircraft suffered failure of
all three engines. The crew and passengers prepared for
an emergency landing in the Atlantic Ocean, but the pi-
lots were able to restart an engine and land safely in
Miami. The plaintiffs sued Eastern claiming mental
anguish related to the preparations for the emergency
landing and included a claim under the Warsaw Conven-
tion. The defendants moved to dismiss on the grounds
that mental anguish is not compensable under the War-
saw Convention.
The court in In re Eastern Airlines held that mental
anguish was not compensable. The court reviewed the
language of Article 17 of the Convention in its original
French. Article 17 provides that the air carrier shall be
liable in the event of the "death or wounding of a passen-
ger or any other bodily injury suffered by a passenger."' 12
The court noted that the term, "bodily injury," was trans-
lated from the French "lesion corporelle" which had been
interpreted in the case of Burnett v. Trans World Airlines 1 3
as requiring "an infringement of physical integrity."'"1 4
109 Darras, 622 F. Supp. at 216.
,,o 606 F. Supp. 97 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
it, 629 F. Supp. 307 (S.D. Fla. 1986).
112 Id. at 312.
" 368 F. Supp. 1152 (D.N.M. 1973).
114 Id. at 1156.
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The court concluded that such an interpretation excluded
claims for strictly mental injuries.
However, in Borham v. Pan American World Air Ways," 5
the United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York held that claims for emotional or mental in-
jury were included within Article 17 of the Warsaw Con-
vention. In Borham, the plaintiffs were attempting to avoid
the application of the statute of limitations contained in
Article 29 of the Convention.1 6 Therefore they argued
that emotional and mental injuries were not within Article
17's definition of "bodily injury." The court disagreed,
pointing out that the Second Circuit had taken a broad
view in interpreting the term "bodily injury."' "1 7 There-
fore, the court found that the plaintiffs' claims were within
the Warsaw Convention. Since the plaintiffs failed to file
their claims within the two year statute of limitations con-
tained in Article 29 of the Convention, the court dis-
missed all of their claims as time barred.
(b) Unusual or Unexpected Events
In Fischer v. Northwest Airlines," 8 the plaintiff suffered a
heart attack while en route between Chicago and Seoul,
Korea. The court, relying on Air France v. Saks, 19 held
that the passenger's heart attack and subsequent death
were not the result of any unusual or unexpected external
event connected with the flight and therefore did not
come within the scope of the Warsaw Convention. Fur-
ther, the court held that the airline's alleged refusal to aid
the passenger after his attack was also not an "accident."
The court dismissed the plaintiff's Warsaw Convention
claims, but allowed a state law negligence claim to
proceed.
19 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,236 (S.D.N.Y 1986).
Article 29 provides that the statute of limitations for claims under the War-
saw Convention is two years. Warsaw Convention, 49 U.S.C. app. § 1502 (1982).
- Borham, 19 Av. Cas. (CCH) at 18,238.
- 623 F. Supp. 1064 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
" 105 S. Ct. 1338 (1985).
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In Margrave v. British Airways, 120 the plaintiff claimed
that a back injury she suffered while sitting aboard an air-
craft which was delayed because of a bomb threat consti-
tuted an "accident" within the meaning of the Warsaw
Convention. The court, however, granted summary judg-
ment for the defendant on the ground that there was in-
sufficient evidence that the plaintiff's back injury was the
result of prolonged sitting.
In Arkin v. Trans International Airlines,12 1 the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of New York
concluded that a tire blow out was an occurrence gov-
erned by the Warsaw Convention. The plaintiffs in Arkin
were delayed on their flight from New York to Portugal.
Part of the delay was attributable to a tire blow out on
take off from New York. The court concluded that the
Warsaw Convention governed some of the plaintiffs'
claims since the tire explosion on the aircraft was an "acci-
dent" within the meaning of the Convention. However,
since the plaintiffs failed to file their action within two
years of the flight, Article 29(1) of the Convention barred
the action.
The court also considered whether the plaintiffs' claims
for preembarkation delay came within the Warsaw Con-
vention. Article 19 of the Warsaw Convention provides,
"The carrier shall be liable for damage occasioned by de-
lay in the transportation by air of passengers, baggage or
goods."' 12 2 The court concluded that this provision ap-
plied to claims "uniquely associated with air travel,"' 123
and did not apply to the plaintiffs' claims for preembarka-
tion delay since those claims arose out of the activity of
the airline in simply operating a waiting room. Therefore,
the court dismissed those claims as unsubstantiated.
The plaintiff in Salazar v. Mexicana Airlines,124 claimed
2o 3 Av. L. Rep. (CCH) (20 Av. Cas.) 17,368 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 1986).
,21 19 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,311 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
1' Warsaw Convention, 49 U.S.C. app. § 1502 (1982).
12 Arkin, 19 Av. Cas. (CCH) at 18,314.
,24 3 Av. L. Rep. (CCH) (20 Av. Cas.) 17,114 (D.C. Tex. March 10, 1986),
dism'd, 800 F.2d 1143 (5th Cir. 1987).
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that his neck was injured when the aircraft in which he was
a passenger bounced twice on landing. The court found
that the landing was not "unexpected or unusual" and
therefore no liability under the Warsaw Convention could
attach.
In Wogel v. Mexicana Airlines,' 25 the plaintiffs were
"bumped" from a flight from Chicago to Acapulco. The
United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois found that plaintiffs' claim came within the War-
saw Convention and was therefore barred by the Conven-
tion's two year statute of limitations. 2 6 On appeal,
however, the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the
Warsaw Convention does not provide a cause of action
for discriminatory bumping under the Federal Aviation
Act. 127
In Striker v. British Airways Board. ,128 an airline employee
grabbed the plaintiff by the arm and physically shoved
him into the aircraft as he was attempting to exit. The
court found that the events leading up to the plaintiff's
injuries constituted an "accident" under the Warsaw
Convention.
4. Exclusivity of the Warsaw Convention as a Remedy
As suggested by Fischer,'29 the courts have struggled
with the question of whether the Warsaw Convention sup-
plies the exclusive remedy for injury and damage suffered
in the course of international air transportation.
In Newsome v. Trans International Airlines,13 0 the Supreme
Court of Alabama found that the Warsaw Convention
provided the exclusive remedy to passengers whose char-
ter flight was delayed for thirty-two hours. Article 19 of
the Convention provides that the carrier is liable for dam-
,2.5 821 F.2d 442 (7th Cir. 1987).
126 Id.
127 Id.
12m 3 Av. L. Rep. (CCH) (20 Av. Cas.) 17,111 (S.D.N.Y. May 20, 1986).
121, 623 F. Supp. 1064 (N.D. Il1. 1985). See also supra note 118 and accompanying
text.
-o 492 So. 2d 592 (Ala.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 436 (1986).
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ages occasioned by delay, and the court determined that
this provision prevented plaintiffs' remedies from being
affected by tariffs adopted pursuant to federal regulations.
Since the Convention provided a remedy, however, the
court found that remedy to be exclusive, preventing the
parties from recovering under claims based on state law.
In Borham v. Pan American World Airways,' 31 the court
found that the Warsaw Convention is the exclusive rem-
edy for injuries sustained in international air travel.
Since the plaintiffs' claims for emotional and mental inju-
ries were found to be within the scope of the Warsaw
Convention, and the plaintiffs had not filed such claims
within the Convention's two year statute of limitations,
the court held that all of the claims were barred.
The United States District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of Florida took the opposite view of the exclusivity of
a Warsaw Convention cause of action in Rhymes v. Arrow
Air.132 That case arose out of an Aero Air military char-
ter crash in Gander, Newfoundland. Eighteen plaintiffs
filed their claims in Florida state court, pleading causes of
action under state wrongful death statutes. The defend-
ant removed those cases to federal court on the ground
that, since the flight involved international air transporta-
tion, the plaintiffs' exclusive remedy was under the War-
saw Convention and that federal jurisdiction was
established by that Convention, relying on Benjamins v.
British European Airways. 33 The court disagreed, pointing
out that Article 24 stated that "any action for damages
however founded, can only be brought subject to the condi-
tions and limits set out in this convention.' 34 The court
therefore concluded that the Warsaw Convention contem-
plated causes of action other than that created by the
Convention itself, but that such actions would be con-
1 Borham, 19 Av. Cas. (CCH) at 18,236; see also supra notes 115-117 and accom-
panying text.
1.12 636 F. Supp. 737 (S.D. Fla. 1986).
--, 572 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1114 (1979).
-4 Rhymes, 636 F. Supp. at 740.
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trolled by the Convention's provisions. Because the
plaintiffs in the state court cases did not plead a cause of
action under the Warsaw Convention, the court found
that there was no federal jurisdiction and remanded the
cases to the state court.
In Insurance Co. of North America v. Pan American World Air-
ways,' 35 the court found that the Warsaw Convention pro-
vided the exclusive remedy for claims arising out of
international air cargo transportation. The court ac-
knowledged the conflict between the Ninth Circuit, which
has held the Warsaw Convention not to be exclusive,13 6
and the Fifth and Third Circuits, which have held it to be
an exclusive remedy. 37 The court found that the pur-
poses of the Warsaw Convention required uniformity in
dealing with claims arising out of international air trans-
portation, and those purposes would be best served if
state law claims were not allowed. 38
5. Adequacy of Notice of the Limitation of Liability To
Passengers For Injuries and Death
There have been two recent significant decisions on the
effect of the print-type contained in the notice of limita-
tion of liability required by the Warsaw Convention. Pur-
suant to the Montreal Agreement of 1971, the notice of
limitation of liability must be in at least ten-point type.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
accordingly refused to apply the limitation of liability be-
cause the Pan Am tickets involved were printed in nine-
point type in In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, Louisi-
ana, on July 9, 1982.' 9 In reaching its decision, the Fifth
Circuit followed and adopted the reasoning of the United
-5 3 Av. L. Rep. (CCH) (20 Av. Cas.) 17,245 (N.D. Ill. June 6, 1986).
130 See In re Mexico City Air Crash of October 31, 1979, 708 F.2d 400, 414 n.25
(9th Cir. 1983).
3 See Boehringer - Mannheim Diagnostics v. Pan American World Airways,
737 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 951 (1985); Abramson v.Japan
Airlines Co., 739 F.2d 130 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1776 (1985).
'4 See Insurance Co. of North America, 20 Av. Cas. (CCH) at 17,248.
1- 789 F.2d 1098; see also supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text.
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States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in In re Air
Crash Disaster at Warsaw, Poland.'40
The United States District Court for the District of Co-
lumbia took the opposite position in In Re Korean Airlines
Disaster of September 1, 1983.""4 In that case, the air carrier
issued airline tickets containing a notice of the limitation
of liability under the Montreal Agreement in eight-point
type. The court carefully reviewed the history of the liti-
gation relating to type size and the requirement of notice
to airline passengers that has developed since the decision
in Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane.142 The court con-
cluded that the Montreal Agreement does not operate as
an amendment to the Warsaw Convention. Therefore, vi-
olation of the type requirements set forth in the Montreal
Agreement does not operate to abrogate the liability limi-
tations contained in the Convention.
The court pointed out that a different result would be
possible if there had been a clear political decision to void
the treaty liability limitation where there has not been ad-
equate notice of that limitation. The court emphasized
that in the negotiations leading to the Montreal Agree-
ment the issue was the amount of the limitation, not no-
tice of the limitation. Because the Executive Branch
continued to support the Warsaw Convention, the court
deferred to that branch, stating:
Since the branches of government invested by the Consti-
tution with the power to make and break treaty obligations
continue to assert the utility of the Convention, and to as-
sert the enforceability of the treaty limitation, these pri-
vate citizens may not, indeed the court may not, define the
treaty limitation out of existence, even in narrow circum-
stances. That task, difficult though it has proven to be, has
been assigned to the legislative and executive branches of
our government. 143
14o 705 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 845 (1984).
14, 19 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,584 (D.D.C. Nov. 26, 1985); see also supra notes 6-7
and accompanying text.
142 370 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1966), aft'd, 390 U.S. 455 (1968).
141 In re Korean Airlines Disaster, 19 Av. Cas. (CCH) at 17,595.
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The plaintiffs appealed this portion of the opinion. That
appeal is currently pending before the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
144
6. Compliance With Requirements
(a) Passenger Baggage and Cargo
There has been continued active litigation with respect
to the effect of a failure to include all of the information
required by the Warsaw Convention on cargo and bag-
gage documents. In Republic National Bank v. Eastern Air-
lines, 14 5 the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York held that the failure to provide all of
the required information with respect to checked baggage
containing currency did not prevent the carrier from lim-
iting its liability under the Warsaw Convention. Eastern
accepted baggage from an air courier employed by Re-
public National Bank with the knowledge that the baggage
contained large amounts of United States currency. The
baggage check documents did not contain a number of
the required entries as set forth in Article 4 of the Warsaw
Convention.
Relying on Exim Industries v. Pan American World Air-
ways, 14 6 the court allowed Eastern to limit its liability pur-
suant to the Convention. In determining whether an
airline that has failed to provide a baggage check with the
required information will be allowed to utilize the limita-
tion of liability contained in the Convention, the court
held that it should take a practical approach "that looks to
the purposes of the Convention's requirements and deter-
mines whether they have been met in the circumstances of
each case."'' 47 For example, in the absence of a notation
as to the weight of the baggage, it could be assumed that
the weight was equal to the maximum allowable weight
for baggage. It was also clear that the passenger was
144 The appeal is pending at the deadline for this paper (November 1, 1986).
'4-5 639 F. Supp. 1410 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), aft'd, 815 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1987).
,4c 754 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1985).
147 Republic Nat'l Bank, 639 F. Supp. at 1415.
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aware of the Warsaw Convention and the limitations con-
tained in it, and therefore the failure to include the bag-
gage liability limitations required by the Convention on
the claim check did not preclude the carrier from relying
on the Convention. Finally, the fact that the passenger's
ticket number was not recorded on the baggage claim
check had no effect since the baggage was assumed to
have been stolen, and there was no evidence of misdeliv-
ery to another passenger. Therefore, the court upheld
the right of Eastern to limit its liability under the weight
provisions contained in the Convention.
Gill v. Lufthansa German Airlines ' 48 also addressed the is-
sue of the effect of an airline's failure to include the infor-
mation required by Article 4 of the Warsaw Convention
on a baggage claim check. In Gill the plaintiff claimed that
the carrier wrongfully demanded that he check his carry-
on baggage even though it was no larger than the carrier's
specifications for carry-on baggage. He did not receive a
claim check for the baggage. The defendant argued that
since the plaintiff received claim checks for his other lug-
gage, the failure to provide the information requested by
Article 4 was "a technical and insubstantial omission that
would not vitiate the liability limitations of the Conven-
tion." ' 49 The court held that Article 4 must be strictly in-
terpreted and, under such an interpretation, the liability
limitations of the Warsaw Convention did not apply. The
court relied, in part, on the fact that the plaintiff did not
have an opportunity to take self-protective measures, be-
cause he was required to check his luggage at the last
minute.
(b) Time Limitations
In St. Paul Insurance Co. v. Venezuelan International Air-
ways,15 0 the United States Court of Appeals for the Elev-
enth Circuit determined that a claim was governed by
" 620 F. Supp. 1453 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
'" Id. at 1455.
,.10 3 Av. L. Rep. (CCH) (20 Av. Cas.) 17,610 (11th Cir. Jan. 20, 1987).
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time limitations contained in a tariff in addition to those
contained in the Warsaw Convention. The court held that
when the notice of loss requirements of an airway bill con-
flict with a tariff, the provisions of the tariff take
precedence.
In Hatzlachh v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 5 ' the court
found that the two year statute of limitations contained in
Article 29 of the Warsaw Convention barred the plain-
tiff's claim. The consignee had refused delivery of the
shipment and the plaintiff requested return of the goods,
but did not file suit until over three years later. Article 29
requires suit to be filed within two years, "reckoned from
the date of arrival at the destination, or from the date on
which the aircraft ought to have arrived, or from the date
on which the transportation stopped."'' 52 The court
found that the shipper's request for return of the goods
established that transportation had "stopped" by that
date.
In Maro Leather Co. v. Aerolineas Argentinas,'53 the court
addressed the issue of what time limit applies for notice of
loss when part of a shipment is not delivered. In the case
of a "partial loss" a seven day time limit applies while in
the case of a "loss, including non-delivery" a 120 day time
limit applies. In this case only seven of nine pallets of
goods were delivered. The court found that the 120 day
provision for "a loss, including non-delivery" applied,
and therefore the plaintiff's claim was not barred.1 54
In Interglobe Imports v. Alisped International Forwarding,'55
the consignee sued to recover for damage to fabric
shipped from Florence, Italy to New York. The court
granted summary judgment for the defendant because the
plaintiff made notice of the claim orally, while Article
26(3) of the Warsaw Convention requires that a notice of
, 3 Av. L. Rep. (CCH) (20 Av. Cas.) 17,191 (N.Y. App. Div. Apr. 23, 1986).
152 Warsaw Convention, 49 U.S.C. app. § 1502 (1982).
153 3 Av. L. Rep. (CCH) (20 Av. Cas.) 17,515 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. Sept. 23, 1986).
15 Id. at 17,516.
-5 3 Av. L. Rep. (CCH) (20 Av. Cas.) 17,432 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. Oct. 31, 1986).
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claim be in writing.' 56
7. Recovery of Punitive Damages Under the Warsaw
Convention
In Harpalani v. Air-India, 57 the plaintiff sued Air India,
claiming to have been "bumped" from a flight between
Bombay and New York. The plaintiffs sought compensa-
tory and punitive damages. The defendant moved to dis-
miss the claim for punitive damages on the ground that
such damages are not recoverable under the Warsaw
Convention.
The court in Harpalani granted the defendant's motion
to dismiss. The court interpreted Articles 17 through 19
of the Warsaw Convention, which are the sections creat-
ing a basis for carrier liability, as plainly limiting that lia-
bility to compensatory damages. The court also found
that the obvious purpose of the Convention was to allow
adequate compensation to passengers for most losses at
reasonable rates. Thus, the court held that allowing puni-
tive damages would be inconsistent with this purpose. Fi-
nally, the court pointed out that no court had ever
awarded punitive damages under the Convention. Where
willful misconduct has been proven in the past, damages
were based upon compensation principles.158
Butler v. Aero Mexico '59 raised questions relating to
wrongful death damages under the Warsaw Convention,
but in addressing those issues the Court discussed the
recoverability of punitive damages under the Convention.
In Butler, the defendant objected that the trial court failed
to apply Alabama law, which allows only punitive damages
in wrongful death cases. The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Eleventh Circuit held that punitive damages
awards "conflict with the tenor of the Warsaw Conven-
'.'1 Id. at 17,433.
,.7 634 F. Supp. 797 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
'" Id. at 799.
u- 774 F.2d 429 (11 th Cir. 1985).
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tion" 160 and therefore an award of pecuniary damages,
rather than punitive damages, was appropriate. Second,
the court held that in calculating damages under the War-
saw Convention it is not necessary to reduce the plaintiff's
damages to account for income taxes which would have
been due on the decedent's income.
8. Wilful Misconduct
Two cases from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York addressed the question of
what level of activity would amount to "wilful miscon-
duct" so as to avoid the limitation of liability contained in
the Warsaw Convention. In Baker v. Landsdell Protective
Agency 161 the plaintiff alleged that she lost $200,000 worth
of jewelry contained in a handbag as it was being passed
through a security checkpoint. The plaintiff claimed that
an employee of the defendant stole the jewelry, and that
the theft was wilful misconduct which could be imputed to
the defendant. The court disagreed and held that if an
employee did steal the jewelry, the theft was not within
the scope of his employment, and therefore could not be
imputed to his employer.
The court also refused to find wilful misconduct in the
designing of the baggage checkpoint, or in the failure to
follow an internal memorandum relating to how to check
hand-baggage. The court found that the defendant's ac-
tion in publishing a memorandum containing instructions
was evidence of the exercise of due care to safeguard pas-
senger belongings, and not evidence of wilful misconduct.
Finally, the court suggested that, in order to find wilful
misconduct with respect to the loss of a valuable item, the
passenger must show that the air carrier knew of the exist-
ence of the item. 16 2
In contrast to Baker, the court in Merck Co. v. Swiss Air
" Id. at 431.
6I 590 F. Supp. 165 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
,r2 Id. at 168.
1987]
122 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [53
Transport Co. 163 found that the violation of an internal
company policy could give rise to a finding of wilful mis-
conduct. In Merck, workers transferred a shipment of ex-
perimental vaccines from a warehouse area known as the
"cool room" to the "freezer room" and the vaccines were
destroyed. Swiss Air had a company policy of checking
several times a day on its temperature controlled rooms,
but failed to do so in this case. The court ruled that the
failure of Swiss Air to follow its stated policy precluded
the entry of summary judgment for the carrier since a rea-
sonable person could find that Swiss Air's actions
amounted to wilful misconduct.
Finally, in Butler v. Aeromexico,164 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit found that the flight
crew's action in failing to use the aircraft radar despite the
existence of bad weather, and the failure to abandon an
approach when they lost visual contact with the airport
constituted wilful misconduct which rendered inapplica-
ble the Warsaw Convention and Montreal Agreement lia-
bility limitation of $75,000 per passenger.
9. Definition of "Single Operation" Pursuant to Article 1(3)
In Lemly v. Transworld Air Lines,' 65 the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of New York re-
viewed the requirement that a domestic flight be part of a
"single operation" with an international flight in order to
come within the Warsaw Convention. In Lemly, the plain-
tiff planned to fly from Baltimore to New York, and, on
the next day, fly on a different air carrier from New York
to Saudi Arabia. Tickets for the two flights were
purchased on different days. The plaintiff fell and suf-
fered injuries while boarding the aircraft for the Baltimore
to New York flight. The court held that the two flights
were not part of a "single operation" as that term is used
19 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,190 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
774 F.2d 429 (11th Cir. 1985).
3 Av. L. Rep. (CCH) (20 Av. Cas.) 17,106 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 29, 1986), aft'd,
807 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1986).
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in Article 1(3) of the Warsaw Convention. The court em-
phasized that the air carrier for the Baltimore to New
York segment had no notice of the international character
of the flight. The court further emphasized that, in order
for Article 1(3) to apply, it must be found that both the
passenger and the air carrier intended the flight to be a
single operation. The court stated, "The separate han-
dling of ticket reservations, payment, issuance and deliv-
ery of the tickets for the domestic and international flights
strongly indicated (as it does here) that the parties did not
consider the flights to constitute a single operation."'' 66
10. Choice of Law
In Harris v. Polskie Linie Lotnicze, 16 7 the court decided
that because of interaction between the Warsaw Conven-
tion and the FSIA,' 68 Polish law must govern the issue of
recoverable damages in a wrongful death case. In Harris,
the plaintiff's decedent died in an aircraft crash near War-
saw, Poland. The case came within both the Warsaw Con-
vention and the FSIA. Article 24 of the Warsaw
Convention requires that "applicable local law" be used
in determining the appropriate measure of damages. The
court found that where jurisdiction is based on the FSIA,
the applicable local law is the FSIA. In reviewing the
FSIA, the court relied on section 1606,169 and found that
Congress, by implication, suggested that "the law of the
place where the action or omission occurred"' 70 would
govern the issue of damages. Since the crash occurred in
Poland, the court found that the "action or omission" oc-
curred there. 171
The plaintiff attempted to counter this conclusion by ar-
guing that the complaint contained general allegations of
-.. Id. at 17,108 (citing In re Air Crash Disaster at Warsaw, Poland, on March
14, 1980, 748 F.2d 94, 96-97 (2d Cir. 1984)).
167 641 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
"- See supra notes 1-34 and accompanying text.
1w) 28 U.S.C. § 1606 (1976).
,7o Harris, 641 F. Supp. at 97.
171 Id. at 99.
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negligence that prevented the court from concluding that
the plaintiff's claims would be based on actions or omis-
sions occurring in Poland. The court found, however,
that in a case governed by the Warsaw Convention and
the Montreal Agreement, the act of negligence giving rise
to liability is "the failure to land the aircraft safely"'' 7 2 and
therefore, under section 1606 of the FSIA, Polish law
must govern the issue of damages. It should be noted
that the court found that Polish law was not significantly
different from the California damage law urged by the
plaintiff.
11. Vicarious Limitation of Liability
In a case not directly related to the Warsaw Conven-
tion, but affecting the liability of air carriers for the ship-
ment of goods, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit recently held in Lerakoli, Inc. v. Pan Ameri-
can World Airways ' 73 that the Lausanne Convention 74 pro-
tected not only the United States Postal Service, but also
those airlines with which it contracted for the carriage of
mail. 175 The Lausanne Convention limits the liability of
the United States Postal Service to approximately $15.76
per item. Lerakoli had mailed eleven packages of
diamonds by registered mail from New York to Belgium.
The packages never arrived in Belgium. The United
States Postal Service contracted with Pan American World
Airways for the transportation of mail to Belgium. The
Court of Appeals found that it was necessary to apply the
limitation of liability contained in the Lausanne Conven-
tion to those airlines with which the Postal Service con-
tracted for carriage of mail. The court pointed out that in
the Warsaw Convention context the limitations of liability
have been extended to the employees and agents of the
1' Id. at 98.
17s 783 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1986).
174 United States Postal Union Convention, opened for signature Jan. 1, 1976, 27
U.S.T. 345, T.I.A.S. No. 5231.
,7 Lerakoh, 783 F.2d at 38.
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air carriers involved in international air travel because
failure to do so would allow the Warsaw Convention to be
circumvented. Similarly, failure to extend the protection
of the Lausanne Convention would affect the ability of the
postal service to contract with airlines for the carriage of
mail. Therefore, the court held that the Convention lim-
ited Pan Am's liability.
12. Class Certification
The plaintiff in Sanchez v. Avianca Airlines 176 sought to
have her action certified as a class action pursuant to Rule
23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The plaintiff's
claim was for a three hour delay in a flight from Bogata,
Columbia to New York. The plaintiff had the burden of
proving that (1) the class was so numerous that joinder of
all members was impracticable, (2) there were questions
of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or de-
fenses were typical of the claims or defenses of the class,
and (4) she would fairly and adequately protect the inter-
ests of the class. Further, the plaintiff was required to es-
tablish, pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3), "that the questions of
law or fact common to the members of the class
predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members, and that a class action is superior to other avail-
able methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the
controversy." 1 7 7
The court denied class certification, holding that a class
action was not a superior remedy since the airline did not
have the addresses of the other passengers on the flight,
and identification of passengers on a two-year old interna-
tional flight by names only would be difficult.17 8 The
court refused to grant a "fluid" class recovery because the
court found such a recovery to be inconsistent with the
policies behind the Warsaw Convention. 179
176i 3 Av. L. Rep. (CCH) (20 Av. Cas.) 17,357 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 1986).
177 Id. at 17,358.
178 Id. at 17,359.
179 Id.
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B. Liability of the United States Government
There have been a number of reported decisions relat-
ing to the liability of the United States Government. They
can be divided roughly into two categories. First, there
has been continued development and refinement of the
law governing the duties of air traffic controllers and pi-
lots. Second, there is a class of cases wherein Federal Avi-
ation Administration (FAA) employees allegedly
performed inspections and certifications negligently, giv-
ing rise to liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA).' 80 For the most part, the courts have rejected
these claims on the grounds that the FAA's actions in the
area of inspection are "discretionary functions" which fall
outside the FTCA. If the claims are not governed by the
FTCA, governmental immunity applies and the claims
must fail. The controlling case in this area is the United
States Supreme Court decision in United States v. S.A. Em-
presa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense.18'
1. Negligence of Air Traffic Controllers
In First America Bank Central v. United States,' 82 the United
States District Court for the Western District of Michigan
held that air traffic controllers who allowed a commercial
jet aircraft to land in front of a private light aircraft were
not negligent in connection with the crash of the private
aircraft as a result of flying into the vortex generated by
the commercial airliner.18 3
In this case the plaintiff's decedent entered the terminal
control area at the Dallas/Ft. Worth Regional Airport
without radio or transponder contacts. The pilot never
established radio contact with the approach radar control-
ler or the landing radar controller during his approach.
The air traffic controllers located the decedents' plane on
radar, and alerted a commercial jet airliner coming in for
,so 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1976).
- 467 U.S. 797 (1984) [hereinafter Varig Airlines].
182 639 F. Supp. 446 (W.D. Mich. 1986).
" Id. at 463.
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landing that there was traffic which was not in radio con-
tact with the controllers. When the pilot of the commer-
cial jet located the decedents' plane and determined there
was no danger of a mid-air collision, the controllers al-
lowed the commercial jet to land according to its final ap-
proach sequence. Decedents' plane, which was behind
the commercial jet, crashed as a result of the vortex turbu-
lence generated by the commercial jet.
The court, applying Michigan law, stated that violations
of the Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs) constitute evi-
dence of negligence under Michigan law. The court
found that the decedent, as the pilot in command, is
charged with knowledge of the contents of the FARs and
the Airman's Information Manual (AIM) with regard to
explanations of and procedures for avoiding turbulence.
The pilot's duty to "see and avoid," said the court, re-
mains, regardless of whether the controller has given a
landing clearance to the commercial jet. The court then
found that under the facts of this case the controllers did
not deviate from their standard of care for the safe con-
duct of planes. The court said that the operational re-
sponsibilities of air traffic controllers are governed by 14
C.F.R. § 65.45(a), which requires compliance with the Air
Traffic Control Manual (ATCM). Under the facts of this
case, the controllers acted in accordance with the manual.
In Barbosa v. United States,18 4 the Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a district court's finding that
the failure of air traffic controllers to inform a pilot of the
weather conditions did not constitute a breach of their
duty. In Barbosa, plaintiff's decedent ran into thunder-
storms on a visual flight rules (VFR) flight. The pilot
failed to request updated weather information from air
traffic controllers, as the AIM required. The Eleventh
Circuit affirmed the district court, stating that any duty on
the part of the air traffic controllers arises from the
ATCM. It rejected the plaintiff's argument that the
"- 811 F.2d 1444 (11th Cir. 1987).
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ATCM requires controllers to provide weather informa-
tion to pilots. Instead, the court held that the ATCM does
not require controllers to give weather information to pi-
lots, as such information is available to pilots both on the
ground and in the air from other sources.
In Rawl v. United States,185 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit addressed the issue of
whether an air traffic controller's negligence could be an
intervening and superseding cause of an accident, thereby
allowing a claim against the United States even in the face
of a pilot's contributory negligence. In Rawl, a VFR rated
pilot and his wife were killed while attempting an instru-
ment flight rules (IFR) approach at night. The district
court found that the flight controller was negligent in di-
recting the pilot to make a series of abrupt maneuvers,
thereby inducing spatial disorientation. Further, the dis-
trict court found that the controller failed to suggest alter-
native airports where VFR conditions prevailed. The
district court held this negligence to be a superseding or
intervening cause of the accident, thereby allowing a
claim for the pilot's death even in the presence of the
negligence of the pilot in attempting to land in IFR
conditions.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit pointed out that there
was no South Carolina precedent allowing a claim on the
basis of an intervening and superseding cause where the
plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence, which is a
complete bar to recovery in South Carolina. Even assum-
ing that it would, the court held that a superseding or in-
tervening cause must be entirely unforeseeable and
unexpected, thereby breaking the connection between the
initial negligence action and the injury. Because the air
traffic controller's negligence was not unforeseeable and
unexpected, it was not a superseding cause, and the pi-
lot's contributory negligence barred a claim against the
United States.
115 778 F.2d 1009 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 95 (1986).
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In Daley v. United States,18 6 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that an air traffic
controller's duty in performing his job function was to ex-
ercise "due care" under Florida law. When the controller
has notice of an emergency situation, however, the court
held that due care requires special attention. In Daly, a
pilot and two passengers in a Twin Beechcraft were on
approach to Gainesville Regional Airport under IFR con-
ditions. They informed the controller that they had one
engine out and were encountering difficulty in feathering
the propeller of the engine. The Eleventh Circuit af-
firmed the district court finding that, in these circum-
stances, the controllers had a duty to undertake
reasonable efforts to immediately determine the aircraft's
exact location, and warn its pilot of the dangers presented
by television towers that they knew to be in the area. The
aircraft collided with a guy wire of a television antenna,
resulting in the accident.
Murif v. United States 1'8 7 involved a mid-air collision be-
tween a Cessna 172 flying under VFR and a Fairchild F-27
flying under IFR. The Fairchild F-27 landed successfully,
but the Cessna crashed, causing the death of both the
flight instructor and student pilot aboard.
The flight instructor and student pilot were "presuma-
bly" engaged in an instrument training, therefore the
court concluded that the student was wearing a hood
which limited his vision to the aircraft instruments. The
Court of Appeals described the Cessna as "burning no
landing light and with one of its two lookouts blinded,
maneuvering at a dangerous altitude in an intersection of
aerial traffic without having notified the controllers of
what it was about."' 188
The court of appeals pointed out that the collision took
place in an area of clear air, with the result that the pri-
mary responsibility for avoiding collisions rests with the
18, 3 Av. L. Rep. (CCH) (20 Av. Cas.) 17,134 (11th Cir. July 3, 1986).
187 785 F.2d 552 (5th Cir. 1986).
188 Id.
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pilot, not the controller. Although the trial court found
that the air traffic controller failed to issue sufficient warn-
ings to the pilots of the two aircraft, the court of appeals
found that the pilots of the Cessna had the "primary
duty" to avoid the collision and that the controller's duty
was "secondary."' 8 9 Since Texas law permits no recovery
against one who is less negligent than the plaintiff, the
court of appeals reversed the judgment in favor of the
plaintiff and remanded with instructions to enter judg-
ment for the defendant.
In McGory v. United States, 190 the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Ohio held that the
United States was not liable under the FTCA for the
deaths of six persons killed when their aircraft apparently
ran out of fuel and crashed. In this case, governed by
Ohio law, the court found that the controllers were not
negligent in the performance of their duties and complied
with applicable regulations governing a situation where
an aircraft runs out of fuel due to the pilot's error.
In Shankle v. United States,' 9' two civilian pilots sought
and received permission to perform a photographic for-
mation flight over Randolph Air Base. After closely avoid-
ing a mid-air collision with a T-37 military jet, the civilian
aircraft collided in mid-air with another aircraft and
crashed, causing the death of both pilots and a nonpilot
photographer.
The plaintiff pursued two theories against the govern-
ment: first, the military air traffic controllers and pilots
were negligent; and second, the government was negli-
gent in allowing the civilians to engage in a poorly
planned formation flight. The court of appeals affirmed,
without discussion, the district court's conclusion that
there was no air traffic controller or military pilot negli-
gence. The court of appeals further found that the mili-
tary owed no duty to the civilian pilots to prevent them
'' Id. at 554.
3 Av. L. Rep. (CCH) (20 Av. Cas.) 17,758 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 27, 1987).
796 F.2d 742 (5th Cir. 1986).
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from taking a poorly planned formation flight over the Air
Force base.
The district court found that an Air Force officer had
acted on behalf of the civilian pilots in obtaining permis-
sion for them to engage in the flight without first thor-
oughly investigating the pilot's flight plan and his
qualifications. Applying Texas law, the court of appeals
held that the Air Force officers had no duty to the plain-
tiffs to make such an investigation. The court stated that,
with certain exceptions, "one person is under no duty to
control the conduct of another, even if he has a practical
ability to exercise such control."' 19 2
In Largent v. United States,' 93 the plaintiffs argued that
the crash of a Beach Baron resulted from airframe icing
and that the weather briefing given by the local flight ser-
vice station was inadequate to warn of icing conditions.
The district court found that the weather briefing given by
a flight service station specialist was inadequate in failing
to advise the pilot of a flight precaution for icing issued
ten hours before the briefing. The court further found,
however, that the pilot was negligent in failing to inquire
about the possibility of icing in light of the forecast for
snow and freezing temperatures which he did receive.
The court also noted that the pilot took off into IFR flight
conditions without being currently rated for such a flight,
and that the aircraft was overweight at the time of takeoff.
Further, the court held that icing may not have been a
cause of the accident, which could have been caused by
spatial disorientation. The court pointed out that the pi-
lot had experienced difficulty in handling a twin engine
aircraft in instrument conditions. The court made a two
tiered holding: first, it found that icing did not cause the
accident; second, it found that even if icing did cause the
accident, the plaintiff's contributory negligence barred
his claim and the claim of his passenger because the pilot
'9 Id. at 746 (quoting Otis Eng'g v. Clark, 668 S.W.2d 307, 309 (Tex. 1983)).
193 19 Av. Cas. (CCH) 4876 (D.S.D. 1986).
19871
132 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [53
and the passenger were involved in a "joint venture."' 9 4
The court therefore entered judgment in favor of the
United States.
2. Negligent Inspection: The Progeny of Varig Airlines
The courts have continued to refine the application of
the Varig Airlines doctrine during 1986. Mitchell v. United
States ' 95 involved the decision of the Bonneville Power
Administration (a federal entity) to adopt the FAA's policy
of not marking ground wires on transmission towers be-
low 500 feet. The plaintiff's decedent was killed when his
crop duster struck such a ground wire and crashed.
In determining whether the discretionary function ex-
ception to the FTCA applied, the district court distin-
guished between "operational level" and "planning level"
activities. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit rejected this distinction. In light of the Vanig
Airlines decision, the court held that the purpose of the
discretionary function exception was to "prevent judicial
second guessing of legislative and administrative deci-
sions based on social, economic, and political policy.' ' 96
The court found that the Bonneville Power Administra-
tion's decision to adopt the FAA policies with respect to
the marking of ground wires was so based. The court fur-
ther suggested that any decision not to warn of potential
safety hazards comes within the discretionary function
exception.
In Proctor v. United States,197 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit faced the question of
whether the discretionary function exception would bar a
claim that the FAA failed to adequately inspect a specific
portion of an aircraft. In Vanig Airlines, the Supreme Court
ruled that the decision to adopt a "spot-check" system of
inspection, and the application of that system to the spe-
1114 Id. at 4885 n. 1.
.. 787 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1986).
,m Id. at 468.
.7 781 F.2d 752 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2918 (1986).
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cific aircraft involved in that case, came within the discre-
tionary function exception. In Proctor, the plaintiffs
alleged that the FAA did carry out an inspection, but did
so negligently. The Court of Appeals, however, cited the
language from Varig that "the discretionary function ex-
ception precludes a tort action based on the conduct of
the FAA in certificating ... aircraft for use in commercial
aviation."' 9 8 Based on this broad language, the court
held that a claim for negligence in performing an actual
inspection also falls within the discretionary function
exception.
In Colorado Flying Academy v. United States,' 99the Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that an employee's de-
cisions in designing the terminal control area for Denver's
Stapleton Airport came within the discretionary function
exception.2 0 0 The issue raised in Colorado Flying Academy
related to the failure of the designer to follow FAA regula-
tions in designing the terminal control area.
In addition to the courts of appeals, the district courts
have also interpreted Varig Airlines to grant the discretion-
ary function exception a wide application. In Waymire v.
United States,20 ' the United States District Court for the
District of Kansas dismissed a claim against the United
States based on the issuance of a standard airworthiness
certificate with respect to a Cessna 320 aircraft. The air-
craft had been modified by the addition of a Radome Unit,
during which the Pitot tubes had been moved, rendering
one or both of them inoperable. The plaintiff argued that
Varig Airlines did not apply because inspections for airwor-
thiness certificates are carried out under mandatory
guidelines or regulations, and therefore, the government
employee carrying out such an inspection has no "discre-
tion." The court found this distinction to be unpersuasive
because aircraft inspection involves only the govern-
'"" Id. at 753.
724 F.2d 871 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2915 (1986).
Id. at 876-77.
20, 629 F. Supp. 1396 (D. Kan. 1986).
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ment's interest in regulating private activity, and the pri-
mary responsibility for the safety of the aircraft lies with
the owner. The court pointed out that the FAA inspector
involved in the case was only required, under FAA regula-
tions, to inspect the aircraft "as necessary. '20 2 He was
therefore granted sufficient discretion to make the discre-
tionary function exception applicable.
The Eleventh Circuit in Heller v. United States, °3 upheld
the district court's dismissal of a pilot's action against the
FAA for negligent denial of his first-class medical certifi-
cate. The court ruled that the trial court properly dis-
missed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction a commercial
airline pilot's complaint in which he alleged that the FAA
denied him a first-class airman medical certificate because
of its negligent investigation, data collection, data produc-
tion, and diagnostic procedures and activities. It held that
implementation of the FAA's medical certification pro-
gram is a discretionary activity which is protected under
the FTCA.
3. Feres Doctrine
There was almost no judicial activity involving the Feres
doctrine during the past year until the United States
Supreme Court decided Johnson v. United States20 4 on May
18, 1987. Since the decision of the Supreme Court in Feres
v. United States,205 it has been clear that "a soldier may not
recover under the Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries
which arise out of or are in the course of activities incident
to service. 206 In Johnson v. United States,2 °7 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit had af-
firmed, after a rehearing en banc, an earlier decision of a
panel of the court finding that a claim by a serviceman
participating in military maneuvers against a civilian air
2o2 Id. at 1403.
203 803 F.2d 1558 (11 th Cir. 1986).
2- 107 S. Ct. 2063 (1987).
205 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
206 See Shearer v. United States, 473 U.S. 52 (1985).
207 779 F.2d 1492 (11th Cir. 1986).
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traffic controller was not barred by the Feres doctrine. The
court pointed out that the Supreme Court in Shearer, while
barring the claim involved, had found that the Feres doc-
trine could not be reduced to a few "bright-line rules".20
The appellate court emphasized the importance of deter-
mining whether or not the claims asserted against the
United States would implicate civilian courts in conflicts
involving the military structure or military decisions.
In Johnson, a coast guard helicopter pilot was killed
while on a military mission when a civilian air traffic con-
troller directed the pilot into a mountainside in IFR con-
ditions. The court of appeals stated, "[T]he claims
presented are based solely upon the conduct of the civil-
ian employees of the Federal Aviation Administration (a
civilian administration within the Department of Trans-
portation) who were not in any way involved in military
activities. The fact that the decedent was a helicopter pi-
lot for the United States Coast Guard is not sufficient,
standing alone, to activate the Feres preclusion. 20 9
The Supreme Court, in a five-to-four vote, reversed the
appellate court and ruled that Feres bars a wrongful death
action even when the cause of the death was allegedly
wrongful actions by a civilian employee of the FAA. The
majority opinion, written by Justice Powell, reaffirmed the
continuing validity of the Feres doctrine to bar all suits by
military personnel or their survivors against the govern-
ment based upon service-related injuries.
The Court reexamined the rationale behind the Feres
doctrine in reaching its decision. First, "[t]he relationship
between the Government and members of its armed
forces is 'distinctively federal in character.' "210 Second,
"the existence of . . .generous statutory disability and
death benefits is an independent reason why the Feres doc-
trine bars suit for service related injuries."12 11 Since the
20N Id. at 1494.
2W.) Id.
210 Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 2068 (quoting Feres, 340 U.S. at 143).
211 Id.
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Veterans' Benefit Act provides compensation for service-
related injuries, the Court found unconvincing the argu-
ment that Congress could have contemplated "recovery
for service-related injuries under the FTCA. ' ' 2 12 Third,
suits by members of the military against the government
are barred "because they are the type of claims that, if
generally permitted, would involve the judiciary in sensi-
tive military affairs at the expense of military discipline
and effectiveness. 213
The Supreme Court then found that plaintiff's dece-
dent was killed while performing a rescue mission on duty
for the Coast Guard, whose "primary duty" was to per-
form such missions. Because Johnson was acting under
orders of the Coast Guard, "the potential that this suit
could implicate military discipline is substantial. 2 1 4
In a dissent written by Justice Scalia, four members of
the Court argued that Feres was "wrongly decided" and
criticized the decision. The dissent examined each of the
factors cited by the majority as the rationale behind Feres,
and concluded that Feres cannot be justified on the basis of
these factors. The dissent noted that the Court had not
been specifically asked to overrule Feres, and stated that it
"need not resolve whether considerations of stare decisis
should induce us, despite the plain error of the case, to
leave bad enough alone. "215
In Walls v. United States, 216 the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Indiana found that the
Feres doctrine barred a serviceman's action for injuries
suffered in the crash of a Cessna-172 aircraft on lease to
the Peterson Air Force Base Aero Club. The court ruled
that the plaintiff's injuries occurred while he was on active
duty with the U.S. Army and that his action was therefore
barred. The plaintiff was taking advantage of the Aero
212 Id.
21. Id. at 2069 (quoting Shearer v. United States, 473 U.S. at 59).
214 Id.
21.5 Id. at 2075.
2. 651 F. Supp. 1049 (S.D. Ind. 1987).
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Club, "an instrumentality of the United States Air Force,"
at the time of the accident. 2 17 The court stated that, if the
courts allow servicemen to bring lawsuits for injuries in-
curred while engaged in Aero Club activities, there could
be adverse effects on military discipline and decision
making.
C. Liability of Aircraft Manufacturers
Recent case law involving the liability of aircraft manu-
facturers can be divided into three categories. First, there
has been a major revolution in restricting the liability of
aircraft manufacturers through the strengthening of the
government contractor defense. Second, courts continue
to struggle with the issues regarding the validity of stat-
utes of repose and their application. Finally, there are a
few miscellaneous cases discussing various products liabil-
ity issues.
1. The Government Contractor Defense
The last year has seen a dramatic turn of events with
respect to the liability of manufacturers providing aircraft
products to the military. By early 1986 there were two
significant appellate court opinions on the government
contractor defense. The first was Koutsoubos v. Boeing
Vertol,218 in which the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit held that the defense would apply if the
manufacturer could establish that the government set
specifications for the product, the manufacturer complied
with those specifications, and the government knew as
much or more than the manufacturer about the dangers
inherent in the design of the product. In Shaw v. Grumman
Aerospace Corp. ,219 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit articulated a much more difficult test
for the manufacturer to meet in order to establish the
government contractor defense. Shaw required that the
2 7 Id. at 1051.
21s 755 F.2d 352 (3d Cir. 1985).
211, 778 F.2d 736 (11 th Cir. 1985).
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manufacturer establish that it did not participate in any
substantial way in the design of the allegedly defective
product, or that it warned the military of the design risks
and proposed alternative designs and the military then
chose to proceed with purchasing the allegedly defective
product.
On May 27, 1986, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit handed down a trilogy of decisions
rejecting Shaw and strongly endorsing the government
contractor defense. In Tozer v. LTV Corp.,220 the widow
and minor children of a navy pilot filed suit against LTV
Corp. and its subsidiary, Vought Corporation, under the
Death on the High Seas Act 221 (DOHSA) and general
maritime law. In upholding a verdict for the plaintiffs, the
district court distinguished the leading case on the gov-
ernment contractor defense, McKay v. Rockwell Int'l
Corp. ,22 on the grounds that McKay was limited to strict
products liability claims while Tozer's claim was based on
negligence theories.
The Fourth Circuit rejected the district court's distinc-
tion between negligence and strict products liability theo-
ries. The court reviewed the policy considerations
underlying the government contractor defense. First, the
court noted that the judicial branch has a long standing
policy, based on the separation of powers embodied in
the Constitution, against interference with military affairs.
Second, citing McKay, the court pointed out that civil
courts are poorly equipped to balance the values inherent
in the design of sophisticated military equipment which is
contemplated for use in situations and at performance
levels that simply find no analogue in civilian life.223
Third, the court observed that the government provided
alternate sources of compensation for servicemen injured
22o 792 F.2d 403 (4th Cir. 1986).
2' 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-768 (1985).
2 704 F.2d 444 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984).
22., Tozer, 792 F.2d at 406.
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during military service in the Veterans' Benefit Act.224
Fourth, the court endorsed the discussion in McKay that
military pilots assume the risk of the dangers of their call-
ing, and to treat them as ordinary consumers would "de-
mean and dishonor the high station in public esteem to
which, because of their exposure to danger, they are justly
entitled.' '225
In denying recovery, the court found that the military
procurement process inherently involves close coopera-
tion between the government contractor and the military.
It rejected the test announced in Shaw, requiring that the
contractor not participate in the design of the product,
because "if the defense were to be waived by such partici-
pation, the contractor would be trapped between its fear
of liability and its desire to provide needed ideas and in-
formation. "226 The court concluded that without the gov-
ernment contractor defense "there would be a decrease in
contractor participation in design, an increase in the cost
of military weaponry and equipment, and diminished ef-
forts in contractor research and development. 2 27
The court ultimately adopted the four part test which
was originally set forth in McKay. This test provides that a
government contractor providing military equipment is
not subject to liability in tort where
(1) The United States is immune from liability under Feres
and Stencel,
(2) The supplier proves that the United States estab-
lished, or approved, reasonably precise specifications for
the allegedly defective military equipment,
(3) The equipment conforms to those specifications, and
(4) The supplier warned the United States about patent
errors in the government's specifications or about dangers
involved in the use of the equipment that were known to
the supplier but not to the United States.228
224 38 U.S.C. §§ 101-112 (1982 & Supp. 1985).
M5 Tozer, 792 F.2d at 407 (quoting McKay, 704 F.2d at 453).
226 Id.
227 Id.
"2 Id. at 408 (quoting McKay, 704 F.2d at 451).
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The court held that the defense would be equally applica-
ble to negligence claims as well as strict products liability
claims since negligence claims would equally require the
jury to attempt to second guess military design decisions.
In Dowd v. Textron, Inc. ,229 the families of two navy pilots
killed in the crash of a Bell helicopter due to a phenome-
non known as "mast bumping" brought suit against the
manufacturer. That phenomenon had, in fact, occurred
before with respect to the Bell helicopters involved in the
accident. The Army and Bell both studied the history of
"mast bumping," and Bell then suggested a number of
modifications to the rotor system. The Army rejected
Bell's proposed modifications.
In a per curiam opinion, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fourth Circuit reversed a trial court judg-
ment in favor of the plaintiffs, and restated the
government contractor defense it had previously an-
nounced in Tozer.230 The plaintiffs in Dowd argued that
the rotor system was designed in the early 1960's without
any government participation. The court of appeals re-
jected this argument, pointing out the fact that the Army
had rejected proposed modifications to the systems, and
that Bell could not modify the system without its permis-
sion. The court concluded that to impose liability on Bell
in a situation where it could not modify the design would
be to "impose liability without responsibility." '23 ' The
court emphasized that the Army was aware of the
problems and capabilities of the rotor system which Bell
supplied, but, nevertheless, decided to use that system.
A third case, Boyle v. United States Technologies Corp. ,232 ex-
tended the government contractor defense to breach of
warranty claims, but avoided ruling on whether the de-
fense would apply to subsequent overhauls of military
equipment by the manufacturer. In Boyle, a Marine
221 792 F.2d 409 (4th Cir. 1986).
2.1 Id. at 410.
23' Id. at 412.
2.2 792 F.2d 413 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 872 (1987).
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drowned after the helicopter in which he was flying
crashed in the Atlantic Ocean. His family sued United
Technologies, alleging negligence and breach of warranty
in the design of the escape hatch on the helicopter, and
negligent overhaul of the helicopter control system. The
jury returned a verdict in favor of the Marine's family in
the amount of $725,000.
The Fourth Circuit, citing Tozer, rejected the plaintiffs'
claims based on the design of the escape hatch. With re-
spect to the claim of negligent overhaul, the court in Boyle
declined to base its decision on the application of the gov-
ernment contractor defense to subsequent overhaul by
the contractor. Instead, the court pointed out that the
plaintiffs' claim was based on the presence of a metal chip
in the hydraulic components of the control system. The
plaintiffs had not established that the chip was introduced
into the hydraulic system at the time it was overhauled by
the defendant, and there were two other possible sources
from which the chip could have entered the system. Rely-
ing on Virginia law, the court held that the plaintiff failed
to establish the defendant's responsibility "with reason-
able certainty. '23 3 Therefore, the court reversed the
judgment for the plaintiffs, and remanded the case to the
trial court with directions to enter judgment for the
defendant.
The government contractor defense has also received
strong support at the district court level. In Hendrix v. Bell
Helicopter Textron,23 4 the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Texas entered judgment for the
defendant based on the government contractor defense.
Hendrix involved the death of servicemen in the crash of a
Bell helicopter shortly after takeoff in Hanau, Germany.
According to Army accident reports, the failure of a bolt,
which led to mast bumping and separation of the main
rotor system, ultimately caused the accident.
The district court detailed at length Bell's review of the
2.1.1 Id. at 416.
234 634 F. Supp. 1551 (N.D. Tex. 1986).
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safety of the bolts and its attempts to have them replaced
and the Army's and Navy's rejection of Bell's findings and
suggestions. The court further found that "no other acci-
dent has ever occurred because of a failure of [the]
bolt,123 5 and entered judgment for the defendants at the
close of a bifurcated liability bench trial. The court noted
that the Fifth Circuit adopted the government contractor
defense as set forth in McKay v. Rockwell International
Corp. 236 by its decision in Bynum v. FMC Corp.23 7
The court also found that the helicopter met the Army's
specifications, in compliance with the third element of the
McKay test, since the Army accepted delivery of the heli-
copter. With respect to the fourth element of the McKay
test, the court found that Bell "knew of no dangers in the
procured product, either patent or latent, about which the
government did not know. '238 The court held further that
"the duty of the military contractor to warn the govern-
ment about any defects in the specifications or use of the
equipment which was known to the military contractor but
not to the government must be judged at the time of con-
tracting and delivery of the procured product. ' 239 The
court based this holding on McKay and on Texas product
liability law. The court went on to point out, however,
that even if Bell was under a continuing duty to advise the
government of defects, it had discharged the duty in that
case.
The Boeing Company successfully asserted the govern-
ment contractor defense in Humphreys v. Boeing. 240 Hum-
phreys was injured in the crash of a U.S. Army Chinook
helicopter manufactured by Boeing "during an aft gear
slope landing."' 24 ' The United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted Boeing's motion
2.- Id. at 1554.
2- 704 F.2d 444 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1403 (1984).
2-7 770 F.2d 556 (5th Cir. 1985).
238 Hendrix, 634 F. Supp. at 1557.
2131) Id.
24o 3 Av. L. Rep. (CCH) (20 Av. Cas.) 17,599 (E.D. Pa. July 17, 1986).
241 Id.
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for summary judgment on the basis of the government
contractor defense. The court found that the Third Cir-
cuit had adopted the government contractor defense in In
re Air Crash Disaster at Mannheim Germany.24 2 It then de-
scribed the requirements for the government contractor
defense as follows:
1) That the government establish the specifications for
the product;
2) That the manufacturer complied with these
specifications;
3) That the government knew as much as or more than
the contractor about the hazards of the product as
designed.243
In Humphreys, Boeing and the plaintiffs agreed that the
first two requirements had been met. The only issue in
the case was whether Boeing and the government pos-
sessed equal knowledge of the hazards involved in operat-
ing a helicopter. The court found, based on affidavits
submitted by Boeing, that "it is utterly inconceivable that
Boeing could know more about the hazards involved in aft
gears slope landing than the Army, which had developed
the maneuver and the highly detailed procedures to ac-
complish it in a safe manner. 2 44 Since Boeing had estab-
lished the government contractor defense, the court
entered judgment in its favor and against the plaintiff.
2. Statutes of Repose
Several years ago, in a wave of products liability reform,
a number of states enacted statutes of repose. These stat-
utes typically barred claims based on products liability
theories if the product was manufactured more than a
fixed number of years before the action was filed, regard-
less of when the injury occurred. 24- These statutes re-
242 769 F.2d 115 (3d Cir. 1985).
24 Id. at 121.
244 Humphreys, 20 Av. Cas. (CCH) at 17,601.
245 A typical state statute of repose bars claims for products manufactured 10 to
12 years prior to the lawsuit. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 13-213 (1984).
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ceived varied reception in the courts, and a number of
them have been held unconstitutional under state
constitutions.246
Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp.2 47 involved the application of
the Utah products liability statute of repose 248 to bar a
claim arising out of the crash of a twenty-three year old
aircraft. Unlike some statutes of repose, the Utah law
barred products liability claims on all theories against the
manufacturer. The plaintiffs challenged this statute of re-
pose as a violation of various provisions of the Utah Con-
stitution. In evaluating the validity of the statute, the Utah
Supreme Court first turned to the "open courts" provi-
sion of the Utah Constitution which provides, that "every
person, for an injury done to him in his person, property
or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law".249
After extensive review of the decisions of other courts
throughout the country which have analyzed statutes of
repose in light of similar provisions, the court found that
the open courts provision of the Utah Constitution is sat-
isfied if the challenged law "provides an injured person an
effective and reasonable alternative remedy 'by due
course of law' for vindication of his constitutional inter-
est."'2 50 If the law provides no such remedy, then a statute
can be valid only if "there is a clear social or economic evil
to be eliminated and the elimination of an existing legal
remedy is not an arbitrary or unreasonable means for
achieving the objective." ' 25' The court then found that the
Utah statute completely barred any remedy to an injured
person if it applied to that person's claim. Further, the
court found that the statute did not "reasonably and sub-
stantially advance its stated purpose. 2 52 The court also
14,1 See, e.g., Kennedy v. Lumberland Eng'g Co., 471 A.2d 195 (R.I. 1984); Lank-
ford v. Sullivan, Long & Hagerty, 416 So. 2d 996 (Ala. 1982).
247 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985).
248 UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-15-3 (1953).
249 UTAH CONST. art. I, § 11.
o Berry, 717 P.2d at 670.
251 Id.
252 Id. at 682.
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found the statute to be unconstitutional as violating the
section of the Utah Constitution guaranteeing a right of
action for wrongful death. 53 It should be noted that the
court took pains to distinguish the decision in which it up-
held a statute of repose contained in the Medical Malprac-
tice Act and its decision upholding a statute of repose
intended to protect architects and builders.
The Oregon statute of repose 2 54 received considerably
more favorable treatment at the hands of the Oregon
Court of Appeals in Erickson Air Crane Co. v. United Technol-
ogies Corp.255 In that case the plaintiff purchased a helicop-
ter from United Technologies in 1971 which crashed in
June, 1981, presumably because of a defective compres-
sor disc. The plaintiff claimed to have received docu-
ments in 1977 indicating that the useful life of the disc
was 6000 hours, rather than the correct 4000 hours. The
trial court denied the defendant's motion for summary
judgment based on the Oregon statute of repose and en-
tered a judgment for the plaintiff in the amount of
$7,404,775.
The court of appeals reversed the trial court's decision,
holding that the court should have granted defendant's
motion for summary judgment based on the statute. The
court concluded that the plaintiff's claim was governed by
the Oregon statute of repose and that, under the statute, a
products liability action must be commenced within eight
years from the date of the first purchase of the product for
use or consumption. 5 6 Since the statute did not contem-
plate a manufacturer's negligent actions or omissions
before or after the date of purchase as having any bearing
on the limitation period, any allegations concerning such
actions were not relevant to the determination of whether
the statute barred the plaintiff's claims. The court relied
2-'3 Id. at 684.
2- OR. REV. STAT. § 30.905 (1983).
2 79 Or. App. 659, 720 P.2d 389 (1986).
256 Erickson Air Crane, 720 P.2d at 390.
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on Dague v. Piper Aircraft Corp. 257 in holding that, even if an
aircraft manufacturer has a continuing duty to warn of de-
fects in a product after sale of the product, the statute of
repose bars products liability claims against the manufac-
turer based on breach of that duty after the time limit con-
tained therein has lapsed.
3. Miscellaneous Cases
Perhaps more than any other area of aviation law, the
liability of aircraft manufacturers is particularly depen-
dent upon state law, and, for the most part, that law is
established through cases which do not involve aviation.
During the past year many states have passed legislation
reforming their tort systems, 58 and these reforms should
have a larger effect on the liability of aircraft manufactur-
ers than the unrelated case law regarding personal injury
litigation. However, a review of a few miscellaneous
products liability decisions reported in the last year is use-
ful to highlight recent trends in this litigation.
In Rehler v. Beech Aircraft Corp. ,259 a Beech Baron crashed
after going into a low altitude flat spin. The plaintiff al-
leged that the Pilot Operating Handbook misrepresented
the procedure for recovery from a "steep" spin as being
applicable to all spins. The court characterized this as a
claim of implied misrepresentation, and suggested that
such misrepresentations would not be actionable under
Texas law, which allows a cause of action for affirmative or
expressed misrepresentations. However, the court went
on to find that the plaintiff's theory had been adequately
submitted to the jury and rejected.
The plaintiff in Rehler also argued that the Beech Baron
suffered from "undue" spinning tendencies and that
Beech was intentionally deceptive in its flight tests during
the certification of the Baron. The court rejected this ar-
gument on the grounds that the plaintiff failed to show
2.17 275 Ind. 520, 418 N.E.2d 206 (1981).
25 See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1116 (1987) (Tort Reform Act).
2 - 777 F.2d 1072 (5th Cir. 1985).
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that the FAA aircraft certification procedures would have
revealed any undue spinning tendency, and there was no
direct evidence of any misrepresentation. Regarding the
plaintiffs' claims based on a direct theory of product de-
fect, the court found, after a detailed discussion of Texas
jury instructions, that the jury's verdict in favor of the de-
fendant should be affirmed.
In In re Air Crash Disaster at Metropolitan Airport, Detroit,
Michigan, January 19, 1979,260 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit addressed the question of
the admissibility of FAA airworthiness directives. The
case arose out of a Gates Learjet crash at Detroit Metro-
politan Airport in 1979. Allegedly, the crash resulted
from aerodynamic stall on approach for landing. Later in
the same year, the FAA issued an airworthiness directive
requiring an increase in landing and approach speeds
under certain conditions, and warning that even small ac-
cumulations of ice and snow on the wing's leading edge
can cause aerodynamic stall prior to activation of the stall
warning system. The court of appeals affirmed the district
court's refusal to admit this evidence based on Rule
407261 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
The court declined to follow Herndon v. Seven Bar Flying
Service,2 62 and instead followed Werner v. Upjohn Co. 263 The
proponents of the airworthiness directive argued that
Rule 407 did not apply since the subsequent remedial
measures were required by the FAA rather than under-
taken by the defendant itself. The court, however, re-
2- 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,915 (E.D. Mich. 1984).
2, FED. R. EvID. 407 provides as follows:
When, after an event, measures are taken which, if taken previously,
would have made the event less likely to occur, evidence of the sub-
sequent measures is not admissable to prove negligence or culpable
conduct in connection with the event. This rule does not require the
exclusion of evidence of subsequent measures when offered for an-
other purpose, such as proving ownership control, or feasibility of
precautionary measures, if controverted, or impeachment.
FED. R. EvID. 407.
262 716 F.2d 1322 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 958 (1983).
26s 628 F.2d 848 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080 (1981).
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fused to follow this reasoning. Instead, it cited Werner in
concluding that, if such documents were admitted, manu-
facturers "might be discouraged from taking early actions
on their own and from participating fully in voluntary
compliance procedures.
264
In ruling on a motion for a new trial, a district court in
Pennsylvania recently allowed evidence of a pilot's alco-
hol consumption over twenty-four hours prior to the
crash at issue in the lawsuit. In Stevens v. Cessna Aircraft
Co. 265 the decedent pilot's former wife brought suit
against Cessna for alleged defects in the rudder controls
of a Cessna 411 aircraft, and for an implied failure to warn
of the defects. The crash occurred soon after takeoff
when the plane was at an altitude of one hundred feet.
The pilot notified the tower that he had lost power in his
left engine and turned to land. An examination of the
wreckage revealed that the pilot had not retracted the
landing gear or feathered the propeller of the dead en-
gine. Cessna contended that the pilot's failure to perform
these acts constituted misuse of the plane, because he
could simply have landed without turning at the time he
lost the engine. Cessna's evidence of decedent's misuse
came from a physician trained in aeronautical psychology
who testified that decedent had been under a great deal of
stress in his personal life, and that he had been drinking
about twenty-four hours prior to takeoff. The expert tes-
tified that residual effects from alcohol can hamper per-
ception even after twenty-four hours. Plaintiff objected to
this testimony because decedent's autopsy revealed no al-
cohol in his bloodstream. The court denied plaintiff's
motion for a new trial and ruled that evidence of dece-
dent's alcohol consumption was proper because it showed
the stress on decedent and it supported the suggestion
that decedent's perceptions may have been dulled at the
time of the accident. The evidence was held to be admis-
sible because it is of the type normally relied on by such
2,. In re Air crash at Detroit, 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) at 917.
2wi 634 F. Supp. 137 (E.D. Pa.), aft'd, 806 F.2d 254 (3rd Cir. 1986).
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experts, pursuant to Rule 703266 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence. Further, the court noted that the limiting in-
structions which were given at trial effectively negated any
prejudicial effects of the evidence.
In an action by an airplane owner against a repair shop
for breach of a contract to repair, and repairer's counter-
claim for repair and storage costs, a Missouri court of ap-
peals held that an exculpatory clause excluding liability
for incidental and consequential damages was not an af-
firmative defense and was not waived by the repairer's
failure to assert the defense in its answer. In World Enter-
prises v. Midcoast Aviation Services,26 7 the court held that an
affirmative defense involves additional facts to those
pleaded in the complaint, so that even if the complaint is
true, defendant avoids legal responsibility. The addi-
tional facts include acts, transactions, or occurrences that
are not a part of the original contract or transaction, but
have arisen since the cause of action came into existence.
The liability limitation contained in the contract between
the aircraft owner and repairer does not present such an
additional fact, and consequently did not constitute an af-
firmative defense. The court also denied the counter-de-
fendant's argument that interpretation of the contract
provision was a jury question. Because the exculpatory
clause was unambiguous, the court ruled that it could be
interpreted as a matter of law. Finally, the court found
that the exculpatory clause, which provided that the re-
pairer would not be liable for "any consequential com-
mercial damages," served to preclude loss of use damages
sought by the owner.
In Schneider v. Cessna Aircraft Co. ,268 the Court of Appeals
of Arizona held that the trial court should have given a
jury instruction on the duty of a manufacturer to warn
against flying an aircraft in subfreezing weather without
draining the fuel system. The court found that if there
.2G FED. R. EVID. 703.
2 713 S.W.2d 606 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
21W 150 Ariz. 153, 722 P.2d 321 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985).
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was any evidence tending to establish plaintiff's theory
that the airplane manufacturer's failure to warn of difficul-
ties with operating the airplane in freezing weather made
the product defective, the trial court should have given
the instruction. In this case, there was evidence of a
number of forced landings and crashes attributable to ice
forming on a "tee-fitting" in the fuel lines.
The Missouri Supreme Court, in Nesselrode v. Executive
Beechcraft 269 held that the plaintiff's evidence in that case
sufficiently established the existence of an industry stan-
dard intended to safeguard against the incorrect installa-
tion of symmetrical flight parts that have asymmetrical
functions. Plaintiffs' decedent died as a result of mechani-
cal trim tab actuators that were accidentally reversed dur-
ing a mechanical inspection, causing them to work in
reverse during flight. The Missouri Supreme Court dis-
cussed various standards used in different jurisdictions to
define when a product is "defective" under the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts, Section 402A, but noted that
Missouri has neither adopted the consumer expectation
test nor a risk-utility test, but instead presents the issue of
a product being "unreasonably dangerous" to the jury as
an ultimate issue.
The court also addressed the Missouri standard for a
failure to warn case, concluding that such a case requires a
two-step inquiry. First, the fact finder must determine
whether the product is unreasonably dangerous when put
to normal use without proper warnings, and second, it
must determine whether the manufacturer gave adequate
warnings or any warnings at all. Under this standard, the
court upheld the jury's determination that defendant's
failure to affix a warning to visually identical actuators or a
warning in the maintenance manual about the possibility
of an accidental reversal was the proximate cause of the
accident.
In Thibodeau v. Beech Aircraft Corp. ,270 the United States
2 9 707 S.W.2d 371 (Mo. 1986).
27o No. 84-2710, slip op. (10th Cir. Mar. 30, 1987).
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed ajury ver-
dict allowing recovery to a plaintiff for injuries sustained
when the cabin door of his Beechcraft Baron 95-B55 air-
plane opened during flight. At trial, plaintiff prevailed on
negligence and failure to warn claims, and Beech won on
strict liability grounds. On appeal, Beech argued that the
trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury that its com-
pliance with applicable FAA rules creates a rebuttable
presumption that its product was not defective and it was
not negligent. The Eleventh Circuit held that the FAA
regulations were inapplicable to the action.
In Norton v. Temsco Helicopters,27' the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judg-
ment in favor of defendant on plaintiff's claim of inten-
tional interference with prospective economic advantage.
Plaintiff, an employee of defendant Temsco Helicopters,
suffered injuries when the helicopter he was piloting
crashed. He sued Hiller Aircraft, the manufacturer of cer-
tain bearings which were found to have caused the crash.
Temsco Helicopters intervened as a plaintiff in Norton's
prior action, and in a subrogation action on behalf of its
insurer.
In the prior action, the helicopter manufacturer claimed
that an improper maintenance procedure, "staking", was
the cause of the helicopter's failure. Temsco claimed that
"staking" had not been performed on the helicopter.
Before trial in the prior action, it was discovered that
Temsco had indeed "staked" the aircraft, but, during dis-
covery, had altered maintenance records to conceal this
fact. The parties entered into a settlement agreement
worth approximately $1 million. In the present action,
plaintiff alleged that Temsco's actions in altering the
maintenance records forced him to settle his claim against
the manufacturer for less than its actual worth.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's finding
that the plaintiff could not establish the elements of his
27,- 812 F.2d 1411 (9th Cir. 1987) (Decision not for publication and not to be
cited to or used by courts).
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cause of action. The court found that Temsco Helicop-
ters' alteration of the records could not have damaged the
plaintiff, because such alteration did not affect his right to
recover damages against the manufacturer.
In Monger v. Cessna Aircraft Co.,272 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the dis-
trict court's refusal to instruct the jury that a pilot was pre-
sumed to have checked his aircraft for water in the fuel
tank prior to takeoff. Experts testified that the crash oc-
curred because the plane ran out of fuel, and circumstan-
tial evidence indicated that the decedent pilot did not
have access to a ladder which could have allowed him to
conduct a proper inspection of the aircraft's fuel supply
before takeoff. Such evidence of the decedent pilot's neg-
ligence in failing to check the fuel, according to the Eighth
Circuit, was enough to deprive the plaintiff of an instruc-
tion on the presumption of due care.
The Eighth Circuit also upheld the district court's re-
fusal to allow into evidence a letter from the chief of the
FAA's Flight Standards Division which criticized Cessna
for past failures to identify safety problems. The court
said that the letter did not specifically relate to whether
this model plane and its fuel system had received proper
FAA approval or were otherwise unsafe.
In Bancorp Leasing & Financial Corp. v. Augusta Aviation
Corp. ,273 the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of an action
on the grounds that the plaintiff had not obtained service
within sixty days of filing the complaint, as required under
Oregon's two year products liability statute of limitations.
At the district court level, Bancorp, which had purchased
the rights to the helicopter from codefendant Aircraft At
Your Call, Inc., and then leased the helicopter back to co-
defendant, argued that the statute should be tolled be-
cause none of the defendants were present in Oregon at
the time of the accident. The Ninth Circuit rejected this
272 812 F.2d 402 (8th Cir. 1987).
2 813 F.2d 272 (9th Cir. 1987).
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argument, citing numerous authorities in favor of its hold-
ing. The court also rejected plaintiffs' argument that the
breach of warranty claim is governed by the four-year stat-
ute of limitations, finding that the Oregon legislature in-
tended to include all products-related claims within the
products liability statute.
In Norris v. Bell Helicopter Textron,274 the Louisiana Court
of Appeals held that the original manufacturer of a heli-
copter was not liable in products liability because major
alterations and repairs were made to the helicopter be-
tween the time of design and manufacturer and the time
of the accident. The court stated that, though the manu-
facturer would not be exculpated from liability merely by
the fact that major alterations and repairs had been made
to the product, in this case seventeen years had passed
from manufacture to accident. In addition the helicopter
log was missing for records of repair from 1963 through
1976. Under these facts, the appellate court reversed the
trial court's finding that the crash had been caused by "ex-
cessive flapping" and that such "excessive flapping" was a
design defect in the Bell 47 helicopter. The court also
ruled that the trial court's admission and consideration of
Army reports about related "flapping" problems on heli-
copters was erroneous, because the plaintiff failed to show
similarity between the helicopters in the reports and the
Bell 47 helicopter.
In United States Helicopters v. Black,275 the North Carolina
Supreme Court, in an action by a helicopter manufacturer
seeking recovery for damage to one of its helicopters,
held that an individual who rented the helicopter from the
company was a bailee of the helicopter. At trial, the court
granted the defendant a directed verdict, and the North
Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed. Under the facts of
this case, the defendant rented the helicopter from the
plaintiff in order to take flying lessons. The defendant re-
jected the plaintiff's offered helicopter instructor, and in-
274 495 So. 2d 976 (La. Ct. App. 1986).
275 3 Av. L. Rep. (CCH) (20 Av. Cas.) 17,623 (N.C. Aug. 29, 1986).
1987] 153
154 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [53
stead received instruction from a friend who was a
qualified instructor. The crash of the helicopter resulted
from the negligence of the instructor. The North Caro-
lina Supreme Court reversed the decision of the appellate
court, and held that a bailee is liable not only for the re-
sults of his own negligence but also for that of his agents.
Since the defendant's instructor was at the controls of the
helicopter at the defendant's request he was held to be
the defendant's agent. The plaintiff had previously estab-
lished that the defendant was the bailee of the helicopter
because the plaintiff delivered the helicopter to the de-
fendant, the defendant accepted, and the helicopter was
in the defendant's sole custody at the time of the accident.
V. TORT LITIGATION - DAMAGES
Damages law applied in aviation cases is usually gov-
erned by state law, although in certain limited circum-
stances federal or foreign law may apply. To the extent
there are any damages issues unique to aviation law, they
generally involve choice of law issues and the scope of re-
coverable damages under the Warsaw Convention. A re-
view of the other issues concerning damages that have
arisen in aviation cases can therefore give no more than a
brief overview of the area.
A. Wrongful Death Cases
In Yowell v. Piper Aircraft Corp. ,276 the Texas Supreme
Court addressed a number of issues concerning recovery
in wrongful death cases. The court first considered the
plaintiff's claim for loss of prospective increase of inheri-
tance. The court pointed out that, in Texas, allowing the
recovery of such loss would not constitute a double recov-
ery because the decedent's estate has no cause of action
for lost future earnings. The court rejected the defend-
ant's argument that loss of inheritance damages are too
speculative, reasoning that such damages are no more
,i 703 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. 1986).
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speculative than the other elements of "pecuniary loss in
a wrongful death action such as lost support, guidance,
and training."' 27 7 Loss of inheritance damages were de-
fined as "the present value that the deceased, in reason-
able probability, would have added to the estate and left
at natural death to the statutory wrongful death benefi-
ciaries but for the wrongful act causing the premature
death." 278
In Yowell, the jury awarded the estate of each of the four
decedents $500,000 for mental anguish suffered prior to
death. The plaintiffs added the claim for mental anguish
on the last day of trial, after the close of testimony. The
Texas Supreme Court held that this was acceptable since
Piper had sought, and received, leave to change its theory
of defense in mid-trial.
In addition to the mental anguish claims, the adult
plaintiffs sought damages for loss of society, companion-
ship, and affection. The court extended its previous hold-
ing allowing recovery for loss of companionship and
society for the death of a minor child to cover any family
member entitled to recover under the Texas Wrongful
Death Statute.279
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
also addressed the issue of loss of inheritance as an ele-
ment of wrongful death damages in Marks v. Pan American
World Airways.2 0 That case involved Louisiana law, which
had traditionally denied loss of inheritance as an element
of wrongful death damages. The Fifth Circuit found,
however, that when the Louisiana legislature amended the
wrongful death statute28 ' in 1961 to include claims of
adult children among the "primary class" of survivors, it
cast doubt upon the continued denial of loss of inheri-
tance as an element of damages. The court did not rule
277 Id. at 633.
278 Id.
271, TEX. CIv. PRtc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.004 (Vernon 1986).
... 785 F.2d 539 (5th Cir. 1986).
2, LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 2315 (West Supp. 1986).
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on whether the plaintiffs could recover such damages in
that case, because it found that the plaintiffs' expert testi-
mony as to the amount of such damages was too specula-
tive and conjectural. The court cited lack of persuasive
evidence as to the decedent's future work plans, invest-
ments, spending habits, commitments to savings plans,
tax planning, and the effect of federal and state estate and
inheritance taxes. In Marks, the court also approved the
award of $250,000 per parent for each of the four chil-
dren of the two decedents for loss of love and affection.
The court returned to the issue of expert testimony
with respect to loss of inheritance claims in the case of
Eymard v. Pan American World Airways.282 In a very strongly
worded opinion, the court held that federal trial court
judges have a duty to "take hold of expert testimony in
federal trials, ' 283 and strongly disapproved of the practice
of simply letting all expert testimony go to the jury re-
gardless of its reliability. The court pointed to signs which
it felt indicated the inadmissibility of expert testimony.
First, the court pointed to testimony which the expert
would not "be willing to express in an article submitted to
a refereed journal of their discipline or in other contexts
subject to peer review. ' 2 4 The second sign of inadmissi-
bility cited by the court was testimony from the "profes-
sional expert" who spent substantially all of his time
consulting with attorneys and testifying.8 5 The court did
not rule testimony from such an expert inadmissible per
se, but commented that "experts whose opinions are
available to the highest bidder have no place testifying in
a court of law, before a jury, and with the imprimatur of
the trial judge's decision that he is an 'expert.' "286 The
court found that the testimony of the economist used to
support the claim of loss of inheritance was based on
282 795 F.2d 1230 (5th Cir. 1986).





speculation and was "so abusive of the known facts, and
so removed from any area of demonstrated expertise, as
to provide no reasonable basis for calculating [the amount
of inheritance]. 2 87
The jury in Eymard awarded $1,100,000 to each of the
three children of the two decedents. The awards were
based upon a general verdict rather than special interrog-
atories giving an item by item calculation of the elements
of damages. The court of appeals suggested that the trial
court should have used special interrogatories.
One element of the plaintiffs' damage claims was the
loss to the surviving children of the love and affection of
an unborn brother who was killed in the crash. The court
allowed this recovery based on a Louisiana statute specifi-
cally providing for recovery for the wrongful death of an
unborn child. The court, however, limited the recovery to
$10,000 per surviving child.
After reviewing all the evidence relating to damages,
the court concluded that the maximum allowable award to
each child was $801,000. Because the jury had awarded
more, and the jury's calculation of damages was unclear
since no special interrogatories were used, the court re-
manded the case to the district court for a new trial on
damages and ordered that the district court use special
interrogatories in submitting the case to the jury.
In Matuz v. Gearadin Corp. ,28 the California Court of Ap-
peals considered whether a meretricious spouse could re-
cover under the California Wrongful Death Act. The case
arose out of an air crash on Catalina Island. The plaintiff
was a passenger in the aircraft and witnessed the injury
and death of her meretricious spouse. With respect to the
spouse, the complaint alleged that for up to five years
prior to January 3, 1983, plaintiff and the decedent had a
"stable and significant relationship with each other" and a
mutual understanding and agreement to cohabitate and
287 Id. at 1235.
28 183 Cal. App. 3d 776, 228 Cal. Rptr. 442 (1986).
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eventually marry. Plaintiff and the decedent maintained
exclusive sexual relations with each other, had a "family
type" relationship in that they maintained one residence
at which they lived together and gave the appearance of a
marriage relationship, and shared a "high degree of eco-
nomic cooperation and entanglement." The court deter-
mined that recovery for wrongful death was governed
exclusively by the California Wrongful Death Act. That
statute allows recovery for a "putative spouse," but has no
provision allowing recovery for a meretricious spouse.
The court found that the term "putative spouse" means
that the surviving spouse of a void or voidable marriage
must have a good faith belief that the marriage was valid.
The plaintiff in Matuz did not claim that she believed she
was married.
In rejecting plaintiff's claims based on the equal protec-
tion provisions of the California and United States Consti-
tutions, the court set forth three considerations
supporting the legislature's refusal to extend recovery to
meretricious spouses: (a) the legislature could reasonably
conclude that a relationship which the parties have chosen
not to formalize by marriage lacks the necessary perma-
nence to allow the survivor to recover damages for wrong-
ful death, which look to the future and are intended to
compensate for future loss, (b) an action based on a mere-
tricious relationship presents greater problems of proof
and dangers of fraudulent claims than an action by a
spouse or putative spouse, and (c) the exclusion of mere-
tricious spouses is reasonably related to the state's legiti-
mate interest in promoting marriage.
In McCandless v. Beech Aircraft Corp. ,289 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed wrongful
death damages arising out of the crash of a Beech Baron.
The decedent was a self-employed businessman who op-
erated a ranch, a cattle sale barn, a cattle feed lot, and an
aviation school. The only testimony on the loss of sup-
2, 779 F.2d 220 (5th Cir. 1985).
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port element of damages was by a neighbor of the dece-
dent who testified that it would cost $50,000 to hire help
to perform the services previously performed by the dece-
dent. The court found this to be sufficient evidence to
support the jury's verdict of $200,000 for loss of support.
The court also examined whether mental anguish was re-
coverable under the Texas Wrongful Death Act.2 90 It
found that Texas law allowed recovery by a decedent's
children but went on to hold that Texas would require a
physical manifestation of mental anguish before allowing
such recovery. According to the court the record did not
contain any "evidence of mental anguish beyond mere
sorrow or grief."' 29' Therefore, the court refused to allow
recovery for mental anguish.
In In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Illinois on May 25,
1979, 92 the Seventh Circuit upheld a $3 million damage
award in favor of the widow of a pilot killed in an air
crash. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the trial court's exclu-
sion of evidence regarding the widow's receipt of approxi-
mately $425,000 in insurance payments for the purpose of
reducing the widow's damages for lost support. The
court said that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
by deciding to exclude evidence of the receipt of insur-
ance benefits, because the danger of unfair prejudice sub-
stantially outweighed its probative value. However, the
Seventh Circuit held that the trial court erred in excluding
evidence of the income taxes the deceased pilot would
have paid on his earnings, since that evidence was rele-
vant to the measure of damages under Arizona's wrongful
death statute and, therefore, should have been admitted
under the Federal Rules of Evidence. The trial court also
erred in refusing to instruct the jury that its award would
not be taxed, since failure to give that instruction denied
effect to the federal interest of preventing the jury from
inflating its award.
29 See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN §§ 71.001 - 71.031 (Vernon 1986).
211 McCandless, 779 F.2d at 226.
292 803 F.2d 304 (7th Cir. 1986).
1987] 159
160 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [53
B. Punitive Damages
In Andor v. United Air Lines,293 the Oregon Court of Ap-
peals upheld an award of punitive damages against an air-
line. The case arose out of the crash of United Flight 173
near Portland, Oregon in 1978. The jury returned a ver-
dict of $161,275.32 in compensatory damages and
$750,000 in punitive damages.
In upholding the award of punitive damages, the court
of appeals first observed that, under Oregon law, a corpo-
rate defendant is liable for punitive damages if such dam-
ages could have been imposed upon any of its employees.
The court found that the actions of both the United pilot
and the United employees responsible for maintenance
on the aircraft were sufficiently egregious to sustain the
jury's award of punitive damages.
The United DC-8 crash in that case occurred because
the aircraft ran out of fuel. On approach to Portland, the
aircraft suffered a "heavy to severe jolt-jolt" 294 due to ab-
normal extension of the landing gear. The pilot aban-
doned the landing and began attempts to determine if the
landing gear was down and locked. Investigators later de-
termined that the landing gear was, in fact, properly ex-
tended. The aircraft continued to burn off fuel and the
crew prepared for an emergency landing. Unfortunately,
the pilot was unaware of the allowable tolerance in the
fuel supply indicator system 295 and the aircraft ran out of
fuel six miles short of the airport. The abnormal exten-
sion of the landing gear was due to a corrosion problem
known to United on this aircraft specifically and DC-8's in
general. With this knowledge, United had taken what it
considered to be adequate corrective measures.
The court of appeals found that the actions of both the
flight crew and maintenance personnel were adequate to
support the punitive damages awarded in that case. The
-sn, 79 Or. App. 311, 719 P.2d 492 (1986).
'94Andor, 719 P.2d at 494.
295 Id. at 495.
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court characterized the pilot's actions as evincing "an 'I
know better than you do' attitude under circumstances
where following the human and mechanical signals was
essential to the safety and life of the plane's passen-
gers. 29 6 The court also found "United's inattention to a
known defect in landing gear mechanism, "297 to be suffi-
cient to support punitive damages on the basis of inade-
quate maintenance.
United argued that any failure with respect to the main-
tenance of the landing gear could not support the award
of punitive damages because it was "highly extraordi-
nary' 298 that a landing gear malfunction would lead to the
aircraft running out of fuel. The court of appeals, how-
ever, found that there was sufficient evidence to support a
jury verdict that United could have reasonably foreseen
the causal connection between the two events.
United also argued that punitive damages were not re-
coverable unless there was an intent to injure, as opposed
to wanton misconduct. The court of appeals disagreed,
approving the trial court's jury instruction allowing puni-
tive damages "if defendants' conduct goes beyond mere
carelessness to a willful or wanton disregard of risk of
harm to others of a magnitude evincing a high degree of
social irresponsibility. ' 29 9 The jury instruction had de-
fined wanton misconduct as, "deliberate disregard of the
rights and safety of others. 30 0
In Soria v. Sierra Pacific Airlines,3 °1 the Idaho Supreme
Court held that an agreement by plaintiff, the manufac-
turer of the aircraft, and a company under contract to
maintain and repair the aircraft did not constitute a "Mary
Carter" agreement. As a result, the court upheld the trial
court's refusal to require that the contents of the agree-
ment be disclosed to the jury.
296 Id. at 496.
297 Id. at 497.
298 Id.
2- Id. at 495 n.3.
3N, Id.
3o, 111 Idaho 594, 726 P.2d 706 (1986).
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The court said that a "Mary Carter" agreement consists
of three parts. First, the agreeing defendant remains a
party to the plaintiff's action until there is a verdict unless
the court or the plaintiff releases the defendant at an ear-
lier point. Second, the agreeing parties promise to keep
the agreement secret. Third, the agreeing defendant
guarantees that the plaintiff will receive a certain recovery.
In return for this promise, the agreeing defendant's liabil-
ity is decreased in direct proportion to the increase in the
nonagreeing defendants' liability. Using this three part
inquiry, the court found that the agreement between
plaintiff and defendant in this case was not a "Mary
Carter" agreement. In this agreement, the defendants
did not guarantee that the plaintiffs would recover a speci-
fied amount, nor did they agree to increase the plaintiffs'
recovery in any manner. Instead, the defendant manufac-
turer and maintenance company simply agreed not to
contest plaintiffs' damage case against the airline. In re-
turn, the plaintiffs agreed to dismiss their claims against
the manufacturer and the maintenance company. Thus,
the defendants did not promise plaintiffs any guaranteed
sums. Therefore, the court held that the trial court did
not commit error in refusing to require that the contents
of the agreement be disclosed.
The court also found that there was sufficient evidence
to support an award of punitive damages in this case. The
court, however, remanded to the district court for deter-
mination of the amount of the punitive damages. Under
the facts of this case, a failure in the plane's elevator con-
trols caused the accident. The defendant airline employ-
ees used a bolt which was both the wrong size and the
wrong strength to connect the pilot's controls with the el-
evator devices. The employees also installed the bolt
backwards, and never secured the bolt with a nut and cot-
ter pin. In addition, maintenance forms regarding the pi-
lot's control rods to the elevator devices were missing.
Finally, the airline employees signed maintenance forms
stating that they had checked the bolt in question approxi-
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mately one year after its installation and found no
problems. The trial court found that, if the bolt had been
properly inspected, such inspection would have revealed
that the workers had failed to properly install the correct
bolt. The Idaho Supreme Court held that such evidence
conclusively showed that the airline acted in a manner
that was "an extreme deviation from reasonable standards
of conduct. 3 0 2 The court remanded to the district court
to determine whether the $750,000 of punitive damages
awarded was excessive.
C. Mental Anguish
In Bode v. Pan American World Airways,3 0 3 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit considered
the adequacy of jury instructions with respect to damage
claims for mental anguish. The plaintiffs in the case were
residents of the immediate vicinity of the site of a Pan Am
Boeing 727 crash in Louisiana. The plaintiffs included
parents and children in a home thirty to fifty feet from the
crash site, as well as two persons who were away from
home at the time of the accident, but arrived at the scene
immediately thereafter in search of family members. Two
of the plaintiffs owned a home that was completely de-
stroyed by the accident.
The trial court in Bode instructed the jury that it could
"award damages to the extent that you find those dam-
ages have been proved by a preponderance of evidence
for mental anguish, fear, fright and anxiety suffered by
each of these plaintiffs as a direct result of the crash. '3 0 4
The defendant appealed, maintaining that the district
court should have informed the jury that under Louisiana
law damages are not recoverable for mental anguish re-
sulting from witnessing damage to another person's prop-
erty or witnessing the injury or death of another person.
The Fifth Circuit agreed with the defendant's conten-
.... Soria, 726 P.2d at 724.
.-. 786 F.2d 669 (5th Cir. 1986).
.. 4. Id. at 672.
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tion, and held that recovery for the plaintiffs' mental
anguish "must be limited to fear or fright for their own
safety, or because of damage to their property in their
presence. '305 Since the record at trial contained numer-
ous references to the plaintiffs' mental anguish over the
peril, injury, and death suffered by friends and neighbors,
and because of the general destruction of the neighbor-
hood, the jury had not been given appropriate instruc-
tions to separate the elements of recoverable from
nonrecoverable damages. Consequently, the court re-
manded the case for a new trial, and did not bar the claims
of the two adults who were not present at the accident,
but arrived shortly thereafter.
In Darras v. Trans World Airlines3 06 the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Massachusetts denied a dam-
age claim by the wife of an individual who was a passenger
on a hijacked TWA plane. The plaintiff sued for emo-
tional distress and mental anguish allegedly suffered while
watching seventeen days of media coverage of the hi-
jacking. The court ruled that the complaint failed to state
a claim for recovery because, under Illinois law, recovery
for negligent infliction of emotional distress suffered by a
bystander who witnessed the injury of another is limited
only to those who were in the "zone of physical
danger. o307
D. Miscellaneous Cases
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit recently vacated an award of $1,142,888 and re-
manded the damages issue for further proceedings in
Woodling v. Garrett Corp.30 8 In that case, plaintiff received
an award against Texasgulf Aviation and Texasgulf. Tex-
asgulf Aviation was the employer of plaintiff's decedent,
who was killed on a business trip. In addition to the dam-
,0. Id.
3 Av. L. Rep. (CCH) (20 Av. Cas.) 17,441 (D. Mass. Oct. 27, 1986).
Id. at 17,442.
813 F.2d 543 (2d Cir. 1987).
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age award, the jury found a basis for rescission of a
$250,000 settlement agreement between plaintiff and
Texasgulf. Texasgulf argued on appeal that it was enti-
tled to judgment as a matter of law on the basis of the
release signed by plaintiff, and on worker's compensation
immunity because it was the decedent's employer. The
court, however, found that Texasgulf Aviation, not Texas-
gulf, was the actual employer, because Texasgulf Aviation
had exclusive supervisory control with respect to flight
safety and operations. Because Texasgulf and Texasgulf
Aviation were separately incorporated, the court declined
to extend workers' compensation immunity to Texasgulf.
On the issue of damages, the Second Circuit held that
the district court erred in allowing the jury to deduct in-
come taxes from decedent's future cost earnings. It also
held that the trial court had incorrectly failed to require
the plaintiff to pay Texasgulf interest on the $250,000 she
received as settlement for the period during which she
had the money prior to her rescission of the settlement
agreement.
In Piper Acceptance Corp. v. Barton,3 °9 Piper sued the
buyer of a Piper aircraft who refused to make payments
under the sales contract in an unsuccessful attempt to
have defects in the plane repaired. Defendant then sued
Piper Aircraft Corporation, Piper Sales East and others in
a third-party action, to recover for economic loss under
theories of strict liability, negligence, breach of contract,
and breach of warranty.
The court sustained the argument of the third-party de-
fendants that the purchaser could not recover under strict
liability or negligence because he did not suffer any per-
sonal injury. The court, applying New York law, ruled
that these theories are unavailable when there has been
no personal injury. Next, the court agreed with Piper that,
under New York law, implied warranties do not run to a
remote purchaser where only economic loss is at issue.
*111 Av. Lit. Rep. (Andrews) 6643 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 1987).
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Therefore, since the plaintiff did not purchase the plane
directly from Piper Aircraft Corporation but from a
dealer, and because there were no allegations of personal
injury, any implied warranties did not run to the pur-
chaser's benefit.
Piper Aircraft Corporation next argued that the express
warranty supplied with the plane limited the remedy avail-
able for breach of express warranties to repair or replace-
ment of the defective parts. The court said that the
limitation of remedy contained in the express warranty
supplied with the plane, and the exclusion of consequent-
ial damages provision are distinct provisions in a war-
ranty. It affirmed that, in the absence of bad faith or
willful, dilatory conduct with respect to the limited rem-
edy provided in the warranty, exclusion of consequential
damages remains effective even if the limited remedy has
failed of its essential purpose. The court followed a re-
cent New York case in which a state court held that a limi-
tation of remedy survives unless it fails of its essential
purpose under UCC Section 2-719(2), while an exclusion
of consequential damages survives unless it is unconscion-
able under UCC Section 2-719(3).3 t It thus granted
Piper's motion for summary judgment with respect to the
purchaser's claims based upon strict tort liability or prior
warranties, and with respect to the claims for consequent-
ial and incidental damages.
In Nyer v. United States, the plaintiff suffered a broken
leg and first, second, and third degree burns over at least
12% of her body. She suffered these injuries while
trapped in her car after the crash of a Cessna 411 aircraft
.,o This section states as follows:
... (2) where circumstances cause an exclusive or limited remedy to
fail of its essential purpose, remedy may be had as provided in this
Act. (3) Consequential damages may be limited or excluded unless
the limitation or exclusion is unconscionable. Limitation of conse-
quential damages for injury to the person in the case of consumer
goods is prima facie unconscionable but limitation of damages
where the loss is commercial is not.
U.C.C. § 2-719 (1978).
m" 19 Av. Cas. (CCH) 5731 (S.D. Ohio 1986).
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flown by FBI agents at Montgomery, Ohio. The court
found that the plaintiff sustained Post-Traumatic Stress
Disorder as a result of the accident. Although the plaintiff
was found to be able to do most of the things she could do
before the accident, the court awarded $250,000 in dam-
ages for past and future physical and mental disabilities.
In Wong v. Spear,31 2 a daughter and grandson sought re-
covery for emotional injuries, including Post-Traumatic
Stress Disorder, caused by witnessing the death of the
daughter's mother. The defendant argued that, with re-
spect to the daughter, the plaintiff was required to differ-
entiate between the injuries caused by the sensory and
contemporaneous sensory perception of the death of the
mother, as opposed to the trauma suffered simply because
of the fact of the mother's death. The court found that
such a distinction could not be made, and awarded the
mother $500,000 to compensate for Post Traumatic
Stress Disorder in addition to her medical expenses and
lost earnings.
Finally, in Hervey v. American Airlines,31 3 the plaintiffs
sought recovery from an air carrier for failure to warn
them of the possibility of inclement weather on their vaca-
tion. The Oklahoma Supreme Court found "no law nor
theory of law which supports plaintiffs' claims against de-
fendant. ' ' 31 4 The court observed, however, that "j]ust as
taking a vacation carries with it the risk of encountering
rainy weather, filing a frivolous and vexatious appeal car-
ries with it the risk that the Supreme Court may impose
attorneys fees as costs." ' 31 5 The court granted such an
award in that case.3 16
-,1 19 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,013 (Cal. 1985).
ss 720 P.2d 712 (Okla. 1986).
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VI. TORT LITIGATION - MISCELLANEOUS ISSUES
A. Cases Involving the National Transportation Safety Board
Case law has continued to develop concerning the use
of testimony and materials generated in connection with
the investigation of aircraft accidents by the National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). While aircraft man-
ufacturers are not the only members of the aviation com-
munity with interest in the NTSB, these cases often
involve products liability claims.
In Curry v. Chevron,31 7 the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit faced two issues which occur
with some frequency in aviation litigation. First, certain
plaintiffs attempted to have their expert witness rely on
the probable cause conclusions of the NTSB with respect
to the crash. They argued that, under Rule 703 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, 318 the expert should have been
allowed to testify that the NTSB probable cause conclu-
sions were one of the sources upon which he relied in
reaching his opinion. The Fifth Circuit rejected this claim
and affirmed the trial court's refusal to allow the expert to
refer to the probable cause findings.
Second, one of the plaintiffs attempted to rely on a the-
ory of res ipsa loquitur in his claims against the helicopter
manufacturer Sikorsky. The Court of Appeals noted that,
under Louisiana law, res ipsa loquitur is only a rule of cir-
cumstantial evidence used in negligence actions, and the
plaintiff's burden under products liability theory is, in the
court's view, less than that required under res ipsa loquitur.
Further, the court pointed out that it was far from clear
that a defect in the manufacture of the helicopter was the
317 779 F.2d 272 (5th Cir. 1985).
FED. R. EVID. 703 provides as follows:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases
an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known
to him at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon
by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences
upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in
evidence.
FED. R. EVID. 703.
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most plausible explanation for the accident, which the
court found to be a requirement for the application of res
ipsa loquitur.
In Mullen v. Quickie Aircraft, 9 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit also addressed the question
of the proper use of NTSB reports by expert witnesses.
The plaintiff's expert in Quickie had relied on the factual
portions of the report in reaching his conclusions, which
were the same as or similar to those reached by the NTSB
in its probable cause finding. Apparently, the expert did
not refer specifically to the NTSB probable cause finding
in his testimony. The Tenth Circuit upheld this use of the
NTSB report. This case also presented the court with the
question of whether an exculpatory provision in a sales
contract can bar claims for personal injury based on negli-
gence, breach of warranty, and products liability. Quickie
involved the purchase of an ultralight aircraft kit by the
plaintiff, a sophisticated consumer who was, among other
things, involved in commercial aircraft propeller con-
struction. Moreover, the plaintiff had met with the princi-
pals of the corporation selling the ultralight kit, and had
actually modified the sales contract for the aircraft. Based
on these somewhat unique facts, the court of appeals held
that the exculpatory agreement was not unconscionable
and would bar plaintiff's claims based on negligence and
breach of warranty. The court remanded the case to the
district court with instructions to certify to the Colorado
Supreme Court the question of whether an exculpatory
agreement could validly preclude claims based on strict
products liability theories.
In Swett v. Schenk,3 21 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit addressed the question of the per-
mitted scope of discovery of discussions in the course of
NTSB investigations. Swett involved the crash of a Cessna
aircraft. Under the usual procedures, a representative of
Cessna participated in the NTSB investigation, discussed
,, 797 F.2d 845 (1Oth Cir. 1986).
.... 792 F.2d 1447 (9th Cir. 1986).
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the accident with the investigator for the NTSB, and may
have expressed an opinion as to the cause of the accident.
At a subsequent deposition, the NTSB investigator was
asked to testify as to the contents of the conversations
with the Cessna representative. He refused to do so, rely-
ing on federal regulations governing the testimony of
NTSB personnel.
During trial, the California state court judge ordered
the NTSB investigator to answer the questions relating to
his discussions with the Cessna representative. When the
investigator continued to refuse to do so, the state court
held the investigator in contempt and eventually issued a
bench warrant for his arrest. Subsequently, the NTSB re-
moved the action to the United States District Court for
the Central District of California. That court dismissed
the state court's contempt citation and the plaintiff then
appealed that dismissal to the Ninth Circuit.3 2'
On appeal, the court held that the removal of the con-
tempt citation from state to federal court was proper.
With respect to the substantive issue of whether state-
ments made to NTSB investigators in the course of their
investigation are discoverable, the court refused to reach
the merits. Instead, it held that the state court had noju-
risdiction to hold the NTSB investigator in contempt,
since the NTSB investigator relied upon a valid federal
regulation in acting as he did. 2 The court found that it
had no jurisdiction to consider the issue of whether the
regulations substantively barred the plaintiff from ob-
taining the requested testimony concerning the state-
ments of the Cessna representative. The court suggested
that the proper method for challenging the NTSB's inter-
pretation of the federal regulations relating to the testi-
mony of NTSB investigators would be a direct action
against the NTSB pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 1903(c) or 5
U.S.C. § 702.323
.'2' Id. at 1449.
-122 Id. at 1451.
12- 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1982) entitles a person to a judicial review, if the person
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In First National Bank v. Cessna Aircraft Co. ,324 the court
held that an investigation report prepared by the Cana-
dian Aviation Safety Board fell within the hearsay excep-
tion of Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8)(c) 325 and is
admissible. Cessna objected to the report, and contended
that, by analogy to federal regulations prohibiting NTSB
reports from being admitted into evidence, it should be
excluded. The court stated that the statutory provision is
not literally applicable to agencies other than the NTSB.
The court then found that the hearsay exception in Rule
803(8)(c) was applicable because the Canadian reports
were "factual findings." The court also allowed to stand
certain statements in the report which were technically
double hearsay. However, it did not allow references to
other crashes involving Cessna to be included, because
the plaintiff did not demonstrate substantial similarity be-
tween the other accidents and the accident involved in the
case.
In Graham v. Teledyne-Continental Motors,326 the plaintiff
appealed the trial court's denial of a temporary re-
straining order to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit. Specifically, plaintiff, the wife of a de-
ceased pilot, sought to have a teardown and inspection of
the plane's engines on the premises of the manufacturer,
as directed by the Independent Safety Board Act of
1974.327 The Ninth Circuit held that plaintiff had no right
to have a technical representative at the NTSB inspection
since these investigations are not primarily for the pur-
pose of determining civil liability. The court also denied
the plaintiff's constitutional due process claim. It then
denied plaintiff's motion for a rehearing and motion for
show cause against the NTSB. Following the Ninth Cir-
suffers a legal wrong because of the adverse effects of an agency action. Another
provision states that any order issued by the NTSB shall be subject to judicial
review. See 49 U.S.C. app. § 1903(d)(1982).
324 Av. Lit. Rep. (Andrews) 6653 (W.D. Mo. Feb. 24, 1987).
.'25 FED. R. EvID. 803(8)(c).
32( 805 F.2d 1386 (9th Cir. 1986).
2 49 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1907 (1982).
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cuit's denial, plaintiff moved for a stay of the teardown
before the Supreme Court. However, on March 9, 1987
the Supreme Court denied the motion to bar the NTSB
from destructive testing of the crashed airplane. 28
B. Choice-of-Law
Probably more than any other tort litigation, aviation
cases tend to present very complex choice of law issues.
This is not only because of the inherently multi-state na-
ture of the facts relating to most accidents, but also be-
cause of overlapping federal and state jurisdiction, and
the potential application of foreign law to certain fact situ-
ations. The courts have continued to struggle with these
issues in the last year.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
addressed the issue of which state statute of limitations
should apply to claims for negligence, strict liability, and
breach of warranty in Price v. Litton Systems.32 9 The acci-
dent in Price took place at Fort Rucker, Alabama. The
plaintiffs' claims were originally filed in Mississippi state
court, but were later removed to the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. The de-
fendants moved to dismiss based on the Alabama statute
of limitations, and the trial court granted their motion.
The Ninth Circuit analyzed the various multi-state con-
tacts presented in the case and found that Alabama law
applied since the helicopter flight involved was to take
place entirely within the state of Alabama and the dece-
dents were stationed at Fort Rucker, Alabama at the time
of the accident. The court therefore rejected the plaintiffs'
characterization of the place of the accident as merely
"fortuitous.'"330
The court then noted that Mississippi courts would ap-
ply Mississippi law to procedural issues. However, since
Alabama courts construed the two year statute of limita-
-2s 3 Av. L. Rep. (CCH) (20 Av. Cas.) 17,516 (U.S. Mar. 16, 1987).
.12 784 F.2d 600 (5th Cir. 1986).
--o Id. at 605.
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tions contained in the Alabama Wrongful Death Act3 3 ' to
be substantive and not procedural, the Ninth Circuit
would apply the Alabama statute of limitations. The court
therefore upheld the dismissal of the plaintiffs' tort
claims.
With respect to breach of warranty claims, however, the
court took a different approach. In the Mississippi statute
governing warranty claims, there is a provision suggesting
that the Mississippi courts should apply Mississippi law to
breach of warranty claims.33 2 The court concluded that it
should follow an explicit provision directing it with re-
spect to the choice-of-law issue. However, it found that
the only connection between the accident and Mississippi
was that Mississippi was the forum state. Therefore, it re-
manded the case to the trial court to consider whether the
application of Mississippi law would be constitutional.33
In Springer v. United States,334 the court analyzed which
law would be applicable to a claim under the FTCA. That
act provides that the government is liable "for injury...
or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omis-
sion of any employee of the Government while acting
within the scope of his office or employment, under cir-
cumstances where the United States, if a private person,
would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of
the place where the act or omission occurred."'335 The case in-
volved Maryland and North Carolina traffic controllers
who were allegedly negligent. The court held that both
North Carolina and Maryland conflict of law rules would
apply. Fortunately, both states' choice of law rules
pointed to the application of the law of South Carolina
since the accident occurred there. The court did not
speculate on what would happen if the conflict rules of
.13 ALA. CODE § 6-5-410 (1975).
.1-12 MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-1-105 (1972).
3Price, 784 F.2d at 609.
.34 641 F. Supp. 913 (D.S.C. 1986).
3 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982) (emphasis added).
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Maryland and North Carolina pointed to the substantive
law of two different states.
In Yates v. Lowe,33 6 the Georgia Court of Appeals again
upheld the doctrine of lex loci delicti. The plaintiffs in Yates
were the wife and children of a pilot who was killed when
the aircraft he was piloting crashed at Dog Island, Florida.
The wife and children were injured in the crash and filed
suit in Georgia, stating in their complaints that the recov-
ery they sought was limited to available liability insurance
coverage. The defendant moved for summary judgment,
relying on the doctrines of interspousal and parental im-
munity under Georgia law. The Court of Appeals found
that Florida and not Georgia law applied under the doc-
trine of lex loci delicti.
With respect to the issue of interspousal immunity, the
court followed Florida law, which does not waive inter-
spousal immunity even where there is liability insurance
to pay a resulting judgment." 7 The plaintiff also argued
that since her spouse was dead, the doctrine should not
apply. Finding no Florida law directly on point, the court
resorted to Georgia law to reject plaintiff's argument, and
upheld the doctrine of interspousal immunity.
The court determined that Florida had modified the
doctrine of parental immunity to the extent that the par-
ent was covered by insurance. Before the court would ap-
ply the Florida rule, it determined that it was not "so
offensive to the public policy of Georgia as to preclude its
application .... 8 The court therefore denied the de-
fendant's motion for summary judgment as to claims of
the pilot's children.
In Wert v. McDonnell-Douglas,339 the plaintiff's decedent
was a member of the Indiana Air National Guard who was
killed during a training mission in Alabama. The case was
filed in United States District Court in Arizona and trans-
179 Ga. App. 888, 348 S.E.2d 113 (1986).
. Id. at 114.
" Id. at 114.
9 634 F. Supp. 401 (E.D. Mo. 1986).
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ferred to the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Missouri pursuant to the federal removal stat-
ute.340 The defendants moved to dismiss based on the In-
diana statute of repose. 41
The court first determined that section 1404(a) re-
quired that it apply the conflict of law rules of Arizona,
not Missouri. Arizona applies the most significant contacts
rule to tort conflict of laws issues. Under that analysis the
court observed, "[i]n cases involving aircraft accidents,
the general rule is that little weight is given to the place of
injury in choice-of-law determinations. ' 342 In cases in-
volving aircraft, "the relationship of the parties is gener-
ally centered on the aircraft itself."' 343 However, the court
observed that the place of the accident in Wert was not
merely fortuitous, since the training flight took off and
was planned for execution and landing in Arizona.
The court reviewed the choice of law question with re-
spect to the specific issue raised by defendants: the appli-
cable statute of repose. It found that the primary purpose
of Indiana in enacting its statute of repose was to limit the
liability of Indiana manufacturers and to conserve the ju-
dicial resources of the Indiana courts. Since the case was
not pending in Indiana and none of the defendants were
domiciled in Indiana, the court found that "Indiana's in-
terest should be discounted. '3 44 The court went on to de-
termine that no state other than Arizona had a "more
significant" relationship to the case and therefore held
that Arizona's law would apply.
C. Death on the High Seas Act 3
45
The Supreme Court of the United States clarified the
scope of the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA) in Of-
.4o 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1982).
.141 IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-20A-5 (Burns Supp. 1986).
.142 Wert, 634 F. Supp. at 404.
.14.1 Id. at 404 n.3 (citing Pittway Corp. v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 641 F.2d
524, 527 n.2 (7th Cir. 1981)).
.14 Id. at 404.
34. 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-767 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
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shore Logistics v. Tallentire.3 46 The Court held that where a
death occurs on the high seas, DOHSA provides the ex-
clusive remedy, and that the measure of damages pro-
vided by DOHSA cannot be supplemented by state
wrongful death statutes.
Tallentire involved the crash of a helicopter approxi-
mately thirty-five miles off the coast of Louisiana. Plain-
tiffs filed suits in federal district court raising claims under
DOHSA, the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OC-
SLA),347 and the Louisiana wrongful death statute. 48
DOHSA limits recovery to pecuniary lOSS, 349 while Louisi-
ana law would allow damages for nonpecuniary loss. 3 50
The defendant argued that DOHSA is the exclusive rem-
edy for death on the high seas, and the district court
agreed.
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court, in a five
to four decision, held that DOHSA is the exclusive rem-
edy available for death on the high seas. The majority
opinion, written by Justice O'Connor, contains an exten-
sive review of the history of wrongful death actions under
maritime law. Congress enacted DOHSA in 1920 to rem-
edy the situation created by the ruling of the Supreme
Court in The Harrisburg,5 1 which held that general federal
maritime law did not afford a wrongful death cause of ac-
tion to survivors of individuals killed on the high seas.
DOHSA created such a cause of action, but in section 7
states as follows: "The provisions of any State statute giv-
ing or regulating rights of action or remedies for death
shall not be affected by this Act." '3 5 2
Within the territorial waters of each state there is au-
thority that the state wrongful death statutes would apply.
-1- 106 S. Ct. 2485 (1986).
347 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356 (1982).
348 LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2315 (West Supp. 1987).
341, 46 U.S.C. § 762 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
', LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art 2315 (West Supp. 1987).
119 U.S. 199 (1886).
352 46 U.S.C. § 767 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
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However, in Moragne v. States Marine Lines,353 the Supreme
Court held that a federal remedy for wrongful death does
exist under general maritime law, at least where the death
occurs in the territorial waters of the United States. In
later cases, it held that the federal maritime action for
wrongful death includes claims for loss of support, serv-
ices, society, and funeral expenses, but not for mental
anguish. In Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham,354 the Court
held that the damages recoverable in a Moragne action do
not supplement the measure of damages provided for in
DOHSA.
The plaintiffs in Tallentire, therefore, proceeded on the
theory that the Louisiana wrongful death statute could ap-
ply separately from DOHSA, relying in part on section 7.
In an extremely elaborate opinion, Justice O'Connor re-
viewed the extensive legislative history of DOHSA, and
concluded that section 7 preserves state court jurisdiction
over DOHSA claims, but does not allow the state wrong-
ful death act measure of damages to be applied under
those claims. The Court rejected an argument based on
OCSLA, which adopts state law with respect to accidents
occurring on fixed structures such as off-shore oil drilling
platforms. The Court pointed out that OCSLA specifi-
cally provides in section 1332(2) that "the character of the
waters above the outer Continental Shelf as high seas...
shall not be affected. ' 355 It held that both DOHSA and its
ruling in Executive Jet Aviation v. City of Cleveland3 56 man-
dated that maritime law and not OSCLA be applied to the
deaths in Tallentire.
The decision in Tallentire suggests that, as a helicopter
goes from shore to an off-shore oil drilling platform, sev-
eral different measures of damages apply to any wrongful
death action arising out of the operation of the helicopter.
While traveling over land, the state wrongful death act
s 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
- 436 U.S. 618 (1978).
3-15 Tallentire, 106 S. Ct. at 2492.
- 409 U.S. 249 (1972).
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would most likely apply. While the helicopter is over the
first three miles from the shore, actions for wrongful
death could be brought under the principles of Moragne,
or potentially under state wrongful death statutes. Be-
tween three miles and the off-shore drilling platform,
DOHSA is the exclusive remedy for wrongful death. But
at the off-shore oil drilling rig itself, OSCLA comes into
effect and adopts the state wrongful death act again.
D. The Hague Convention
The Hague Convention3 57 governs certain international
discovery procedures. The Convention was designed to
address disparities between discovery procedures in civil
law countries and common law countries. The problem in
this regard is two-fold. In civil law countries discovery
procedures are judicial or quasi-judicial in nature, and a
private American attorney undertaking such action may
be engaging in an "unlawful usurpation of the public judi-
cial function, and an illegal intrusion on that nation's judi-
cial sovereignty. 3 5 8  On the other hand, American
lawyers often encounter considerable difficulty in ob-
taining evidence in foreign countries. The procedures set
forth in the Hague Convention were designed to address
both of these problems. In the United States, the issue
giving rise to most of the litigation over the Hague Con-
vention is its application to a foreign national properly
before the United States courts.
In Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States
District Court for the Southern District of Iowa,359 the United
States Supreme Court held that the Hague Convention
does not provide exclusive or mandatory procedures for
obtaining documents and information located in a foreign
signatory's territory.
3.7 The text of the Hague Convention is appended to 28 U.S.C.A. § 1781 (West
Supp. 1987).
.45 In re Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale, 782 F.2d 120, 123 (8th Cir.
1986).
.... 107 S. Ct. 2542 (1987).
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Aerospatiale was sued in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Iowa by persons in-
jured in the crash of an aircraft it had manufactured. Aer-
ospatiale is owned by the Republic of France. It objected
to certain discovery requests directed to it on the grounds
that the Hague Convention provided exclusive and
mandatory procedures for obtaining documents and in-
formation located within the territory of a foreign signa-
tory to the Convention. The Court flatly rejected this
position. 6 °
The Court also rejected the holding of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 361 that the
Hague Convention did not apply to discovery conducted
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Instead the
Court held that where "it is necessary to seek evidence
abroad... the District Court must supervise pretrial pro-
ceedings particularly closely to prevent discovery
abuses. 3 62 The court therefore held that the Hague Con-
vention was an optional procedure to which a court may
turn to facilitate discovery. The Court directed the Dis-
trict Courts to:
take care to demonstrate due respect for any special prob-
lem confronted by the foreign litigant on account of its
nationality or the location of its operations, and for any
sovereign interest expressed by a foreign state. We do not
articulate specific rules to guide this delicate task of
adjudication.3 63
Justice Blackmun filed an opinion concurring in part
and dissenting in part, in which Justices Brennan, Mar-
shall and O'Connor joined. While rejecting the positions
that the Hague Convention does not apply to foreign liti-
gants in United States courts or conversely, that it is the
exclusive method of discovery with respect to those liti-
Id. at 2553.
-, Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States Dist. Ct. for the
S. Dist. of Iowa, 788 F.2d 1408 (9th Cir. 1986).
.162 Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2557.
.- , Id.
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gants, Justice Blackmun found that there should be a gen-
eral presumption that there should be a first resort to the
Convention's procedures. Justice Blackmun suggested
that the lower court's case by case analysis of comity fac-
tors pursuant to the majority opinion should lead them to
resort to the Hague Convention in a majority of cases.3 64
VII. INSURANCE COVERAGE
A. Compliance with Pilot Qualification Exclusions/Warranties
In Ideal Mutual Insurance Co. v. Myers,365 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the
pilot qualifications clause in the context of a VFR pilot fly-
ing in IFR conditions. In that case, an accident occurred
shortly after takeoff from Rockwell Texas Airport. The
pilot received a weather briefing indicating that condi-
tions for the flight were "VFR with no restrictions as to
visibility. '366 A number of witnesses testified that fog lim-
ited visibility at the airport around the time of takeoff to a
quarter-mile.
The insurance policy required that a pilot have "valid
and effective pilot and medical certificates with ratings as
required by the Federal Aviation Administration for the
flight involved. ' 36 7 The pilot at the time of the accident
had only a VFR rating.
The court reviewed two Texas cases which had consid-
ered whether a flight should be characterized as an IFR
flight or VFR flight for purposes of a pilot warranty provi-
sion. In Glover v. National Insurance Underwriters,s68 the
Supreme Court of Texas had adopted a rule that the con-
ditions existing at the inception of the flight would con-
trol whether it would be characterized as a an IFR or a
VFR flight for insurance coverage purposes. However, in
364 Id. at 2562 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
865 789 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1986).
366 Id. at 1205.
367 Id. at 1204.
3- 545 S.W.2d 755 (Tex. 1977).
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United States Fire Insurance Co. v. Marr's Short Stop,369 the
court had held that a pilot who took off in VFR conditions
but knowingly flew into IFR weather knew that the flight
would be characterized as an IFR flight and therefore
knew that recovery under his insurance policy would be
precluded.
After reviewing the evidence relating to the issue of
whether conditions at the airport at the time of takeoff
were VFR or IFR, the court concluded that summary
judgment for the insurance carrier would be inappropri-
ate because there was a genuine issue of material fact. It
remanded the case for trial to determine the weather con-
ditions existing at the time of takeoff, and the pilot's
knowledge of those conditions.
The opinion in Myers contains an extended discussion
of the adequacy of a reservation of rights letter, the duty
to defend and the adequacy of the defense provided,
waiver and estoppel, and the effect of a settlement agree-
ment and assignment of rights under a policy to the plain-
tiff on the insured's coverage. Since these are issues not
unique to aviation, they are beyond the scope of this arti-
cle. However, the court's opinion presents a useful re-
view of judicial policing of the relationship between an
insured and its insurance carrier.
In Ranger Insurance Co. v. Robertson,370 the Texas Court
of Appeals again reviewed a pilot warranty clause with re-
spect to the issue of characterizing a flight as either VFR
or IFR. The court concluded that the controlling factor in
characterizing the flight as IFR or VFR is
weather information received by the pilot before take-off.
If the pilot knew, from the weather information received,
that he would have to fly through IFR weather, to reach
his destination, then the flight was IFR; otherwise it was
VFR. The flight path should be examined as a whole,
rather than in segments, so that insurance coverage does
not flicker on and off as the IFR or VFR nature of the
mm 680 S.W.2d 3 (Tex. 1984).
37o 707 S.W.2d 135 (Tex. 1986).
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weather changes along the flight-path.37'
The significance of this holding is that, apparently, a VFR
pilot advised en route of IFR conditions, could knowingly
encounter those conditions without voiding coverage
under his insurance policy.
The Robertson opinion, like the Myers opinion, discusses
a number of issues related to the insurer's duties to the
insured in the defense of a lawsuit. Any insurance carrier
contemplating a denial of coverage in Texas litigation
should consider it carefully.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
addressed a pilot warranty exclusion in Ideal Mutual Insur-
ance Co. v. Last Days Evangelical Association.372 In that case
the insurance policy required that the pilot in question
have a minimum of 1,045 "total logged flying hours. 3 73
The insured had failed to prove in the trial court, as it was
required to do under Texas law, that the pilot had the re-
quired logged time. The court rejected the arguments of
the insured which attempted to avoid the requirement of
logged time. Instead, it affirmed the concept that logged
flight time is a relevant underwriting consideration to the
insurer, and that therefore the courts should uphold a
provision in the policy which requires substantiation of a
pilot's experience. The court found under Texas law,
however, that even if the pilot warranty provision ex-
cludes coverage, the breach of that provision must have
been "either the sole or one of several causes of the acci-
dent. '3 74 It further found that under Texas law the bur-
den is on the insured to prove that the exclusion does not
apply, and therefore the insured in that case was required
to prove that the breach of the pilot provision, or more
specifically lack of pilot experience, was not a cause of the
accident.
371 Id. at 139 (citation omitted).
-172 783 F.2d 1234 (5th Cir. 1986).
373 Id. at 1237.
.14 Id. at 1240.
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In Insurance Co. of Pennsylvania v. Mather 375 a Penn-
sylvania trial court considered an insurance policy which
required that the pilot be "properly certificated, qualified
and rated under the current applicable Federal Air Regu-
lations" for the operation involved. 6 The insurer al-
leged that the pilot had made false statements to the FAA
when he applied for his medical certificate and had failed
to reveal that he suffered from angina pectoris and was on
medication. Therefore, the insurer argued that the in-
sured had violated the pilot warranty provision, and
voided coverage under the policy. The court interpreted
the policy language as requiring only the possession of a
medical certificate which the FAA had not suspended or
revoked. It refused to consider the validity of the medical
certificate, declaring that the FAA possessed exclusive ju-
risdiction to review the validity of medical certificates. It
acknowledged that the FAA would refuse to review the va-
lidity of a medical certificate issued to a deceased pilot
since such pilot could not present a threat to the public
interest or safety. Finally, the court indicated that its rul-
ing might be different if the insurance policy had required
the pilot to have a "valid" current medical certificate or
had expressly stated that fraud in obtaining a medical cer-
tificate would void the policy.3 77
In Proprietors Insurance Co. v. Northwestern National
Bank,378 the Minnesota Court of Appeals reviewed a policy
which contained an endorsement naming the pilot who
operated the aircraft at the time of the accident "provided
he has . . . a minimum of 1,200 total logged flying
hours. ' 3 79 The parties stipulated that the pilot's log book
showed only 871.1 flying hours at the time of the acci-
dent. The 1,200 hour requirement was based on the pi-
lot's application.
375 3 Av. L. Rep. (CCH) (20 Av. Cas.) 17,182 (Pa. C.P. Jan. 16, 1985).
376 Id. at 17,184.
377 Id. at 17,187.
378 374 N.W.2d 772 (Minn. 1985).
379 Id. at 774.
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In reviewing Minnesota law, the court concluded that
the insurance carrier had the burden of proving that it did
not include the provision in the policy as to logged flying
time with an intent to deceive or to defraud the insured,
or to increase the insured's risk of loss. The insurance
carrier's underwriter testified that the premium would not
have increased if the carrier had known the pilot's actual
logged hours. With respect to the intent to deceive or to
defraud, the court emphasized that the insurance carrier
had introduced no evidence of reliance upon the repre-
sentation of 1,200 logged hours, and therefore had failed
to meet its burden of proving an intent to deceive or
defraud.
The insurance carrier was more successful in asserting a
pilot qualification exclusion in another Minnesota case,
Eastern Aviation & Marine Underwriters v. Gilbertson.'s In
that case, the insurance policy required that the pilot hold
a FAA pilot certificate "in full force and effect. ' 38 The
aircraft crashed while being piloted by the owner's
brother, who did not have a pilot's license, although he
often used the aircraft.
The insured claimed that the policy was ambiguous be-
cause it required that a pilot have a pilot certificate to be
covered in one section, while another section extended
coverage to "any person while using the aircraft with the
permission of the named insured. ' 382 The court rejected
this claim, finding that the policy required a permissive
user to also hold a pilot certificate. It therefore upheld
summary judgment for the insurer, finding that the policy
did not cover the accident.
B. Renter Pilot Exclusions
In Avemco Insurance Co. v. Hill, 83 the Oregon Court of
Appeals refused to enforce a renter pilot exclusion con-
379 N.W.2d 567 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
"' Id. at 568.
" Id.
76 Or. App. 185, 708 P.2d 640 (1985).
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tained in a policy endorsement. In that case, a written
binder had been issued to the insured which contained
neither the renter pilot exclusion nor any reference to the
form endorsement which excluded renter pilot coverage.
The policy, issued after the accident, contained the en-
dorsement, and the insurer argued that the parties had
agreed that there would be no coverage for renter pilots.
The court ruled, however, that under the Oregon statu-
tory scheme relating to insurance policy binders, the in-
surer could not present evidence of the parties' oral
agreement. The court also refused to allow the insurer to
amend its complaint to state a claim for reformation of the
policy.
In Ideal Mutual Insurance Co. v. Patzer, 384 the United
States District Court for the District of Montana upheld a
renter policy exclusion. In that case, the policy provided
that the term "Insured" contained therein did not apply
to a person operating the aircraft under the terms of a
rental agreement. However, the policy identified the use
of the aircraft as "Limited Commercial" including
"[r]ental to pilots. ' 38 5 A rental pilot was operating the
aircraft at the time of the accident, and the insured
claimed that the conflict between the definition of an in-
sured under the policy and the allowed uses of aircraft
created an ambiguity in the policy which should be re-
solved by providing coverage to the renter pilot. The
court found the policy to be unambiguous and refused to
hold that the policy provided such coverage. Its opinion
collects the authorities on both sides of this issue.
C. Other Coverage Cases
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit addressed the question of whether an aircraft is a
"vehicle" for purposes of insurance coverage in Certain
British Underwriters at Lloyds of London v. Jet Charter Service.386
384 624 F. Supp. 426 (D. Mont. 1985).
385 Id. at 427.
s86 789 F.2d 1534 (11th Cir. 1986).
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In that case Aero Service workers extensively damaged a
Boeing 707 in the course of repairs. Lloyds had issued an
"Airport Owners Operators Liability Insurance" policy to
Aero Service. That policy excluded coverage for property
in the care, custody, or control of the insured, but ex-
cepted "vehicles that are not the property of the Assured
whilst on the premises specified in the Schedule. 387
Lloyds claimed that the Boeing 707 was not a "vehicle"
and therefore the exclusion applied. Aero Service argued
that an aircraft was a vehicle and therefore came within
the exception to the exclusion.
The trial court granted Aero Service's motion for sum-
mary judgment, finding that the policy covered the dam-
age to the aircraft. On an estoppel theory, Lloyds had
offered evidence that the same aircraft had previously
been damaged while in the possession of Aero Service.
Aero Service had at that time made a claim on a prior
Lloyds policy for the damage to the aircraft. This claim
had been denied based on the care, custody, or control
exclusion. Aero Service had then requested a quotation
for coverage which would include coverage for aircraft in
Aero Service's care, custody, and control. After being in-
formed that inclusion of aircraft in its possession would
lead to a five-fold increase in its premium, Aero Service
did not request that coverage be extended to those air-
craft. Aero Service later renewed the policy, but the cov-
erage was not included in the renewed policy.
Nevertheless, the trial court found that such coverage
existed.
On appeal, the court reviewed various sources to inter-
pret the term "vehicle" as used in the policy. As de-
scribed by the dissent, the majority found a clear and
unambiguous interpretation of the term "vehicle" based
upon
a law dictionary that goes one way and standard dictionary
that goes the other, an opinion of the United States
3N 7 Id. at 1536.
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Supreme Court rendered in 1931 when airplanes had mi-
nor significance, a dissenting opinion from the Iowa
Supreme Court, and Florida statutes that point both
ways. 388
The dissent pointed out, probably correctly, that a more
logical resolution of the case would have been to allow
Lloyds to prevail under an estoppel theory, rather than a
holding that the term "vehicle" clearly and unambigu-
ously does not include aircraft.
Two recent cases have discussed whether aircraft opera-
tions are within the double indemnity provisions of life
insurance policies. In Sutherland v. Great Fidelity Life Insur-
ance Co.,389 the Kentucky Supreme Court held that a
double indemnity provision requiring that the insured un-
dertake air travel as a "fare paying passenger" would ap-
ply where the insured paid cash and the pilot providing
the transportation lacked a commercial license to trans-
port passengers. In Brill v. Indianapolis Life Insurance Co. ,390
the insurance policy provided that it would pay double in-
demnity if the insured's death was "the result of an injury
sustained while the Insured was a fare-paying passenger
in a public conveyance then being operated by a licensed
common carrier for passenger service. "'39  The court
found that a special helicopter flight in Ireland, arranged
specifically for four executives traveling on business, satis-
fied the requirements of the policy. It therefore affirmed
the trial court's summary judgment in favor of the
insured.
Another court faced a similar issue in Pearce v. American
Defender Life Insurance Co. 392 In that case, the plaintiff
purchased a $20,000 life insurance policy with a triple in-
demnity provision for accidental death. The triple indem-
nity provision did not apply to death as a result of an
Id. at 1539 (Godbold, C.J. dissenting).
707 S.W.2d 344 (Ky. 1986).
.... 784 F.2d 1511 (11th Cir. 1986).
--1 Id. at 1512.
392 316 N.C. 461, 343 S.E.2d 174 (1986).
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aircraft accident if the insured was a member of the crew
or the aircraft was "maintained or operated for military or
naval purposes. 393 The insured later joined the Air
Force and was killed in a crash during a training mission.
After the insured joined the Air Force he had written
the insurer asking whether the triple indemnity provision
applied to his activities in the Air Force. He received a
letter from the insurer stating that the triple indemnity
provision would be applicable unless he was killed as the
result of an act of war.
The North Carolina Supreme Court found that the
triple indemnity provision was not ambiguous and the in-
sured's death was excluded from coverage under that pro-
vision. 94 The court further held that the letter from the
insurer did not alter coverage because its author had
neither actual nor apparent authority to bind the insurer.
However, the court did find that the insurer's actions
could be construed as a violation of North Carolina's Un-
fair Trade Practices Act, which, the court pointed out,
mandates treble damages. 95
.9 Pearce, 343 S.E.2d at 176.
- Id. at 177.
395 Id. at 181.
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